Stettinius, Edward Reilly (1900-1949)

Edward Stettinius

American industrialist and high government official who was the U.S. Secretary of State from December 1944 to June 1945.

Edward Stettinius was born in Chicago on October 22, 1900 to Edward Reilly and Judy (Carrington) Stettinius. His father, Edward R. Stettinius, Sr. (1865-1925) made his fortune in the Chicago wheat pits and later became a successful businessman. In 1915, he was retained by J.P. Morgan to organize a department for munitions purchase by the British and French governments during World War I. Through his efforts, the U.S. arms-making capacity exceeded the combined capacity of Britain and France by war’s end, and Stettinius Sr. won the “tag of father of the military industrial complex.” In 1916, he became a full partner in J.P. Morgan and Co. He was described by his contemporaries as possessing “a meticulous, almost obsessive, attention to detail” and an “almost terrifying sense of responsibility.” 1 The younger Stettinius grew up in a mansion on the family’s 13-acre estate on Staten Island and graduated from the Pomfret School in 1920. He continued his education at the University of Virginia, but left college in 1924 without a degree, reportedly neglecting his studies in favor of social work. In 1924, he joined the General Motors Company as a stock clerk but ascended the corporate ladder rapidly. By 1926, Stettinius had become assistant to General Motors Vice-President John Lee Pratt, who was a friend of the Stettinius family. That year, he married Virginia Gordon-Wallace, who came from a prominent family in Richmond, Virginia. Intent on improving the lives of GM’s workers, Stettinius developed a program of employee benefits. In 1931, he was named the company’s vice-president in charge of industrial and public relations.

Stettinius’s continued commitment to social work – and particularly his work for unemployment relief projects – brought him in contact with New York’s governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. After Roosevelt was elected president, he invited Stettinius to work on the Industrial Advisory Board in the National Recovery Administration (NRA), but Stettinius’s early government service turned out to be short-lived. In 1934, he moved to U.S. Steel Corporation as chairman of its finance committee, and in 1938 he became its board chairman.

Stettinius’s successful business career and proven abilities as an efficient top manager, along with his strong sense of social responsibility, continued to impress President Roosevelt. In 1940, Roosevelt succeeded in luring Stettinius back to government service to be director of the Priorities Division of the Office of Production Management (OPM). On August 28, 1941, Harry Hopkins asked Stettinius to take over from him the administration of the government’s Lend-Lease program, which was rapidly growing in scale; on September 2, Stettinius became the administrator of Lend-Lease Aid to the Allies. In 1943, he wrote a book, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. 2

In 1943, Roosevelt appointed Stettinius under secretary of state. In that capacity, he headed the U.S. delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference with representatives of the other Great Powers in the summer of 1944 – and is credited with succeeding in brokering an agreement on the structure of the future United Nations Organization. In November 1944, the U.S. Senate confirmed Stettinius as the replacement for Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had to retire due to ill health.

Stettinius with Anthony Eden and Averell Harriman at Yalta, February 1945

As secretary of state, Stettinius continued the reorganization of the Department of State he had begun as under secretary, tightening its structure, enhancing its manageability, bringing it into closer contact with other government agencies – and improving its relations with the public at large. At the same time, he was occupied with laying the groundwork for the future United Nations Organization. In early 1945, Stettinius accompanied President Roosevelt to the Yalta Conference of the leaders of the Big Three (February 2-8, 1945), to plan the final defeat and occupation of Nazi Germany and discuss the fate of the liberated or defeated countries of Eastern Europe, the future United Nations Organization and other issues. Stettinius is credited in particular with achieving agreement among the Big Three on the provisional rules of procedure for the UN Security Council, which were developed at the Department of State under his supervision.

After the Yalta Conference, Stettinius led the U.S. delegation at the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace, which was held in Mexico City on February 21-March 8, 1945, and is commonly known as the Chapultepec Conference. There he lined up Latin American support for the United Nations and facilitated the adoption of The Act of Chapultepec (March 3, 1945), which was a significant milestone in the history of Pan-Americanism.

On his return to Washington, D.C., Stettinius’s major commitment was laying the groundwork for the conference in San Francisco that would officially create the United Nations. He led the U.S. delegation in San Francisco and was present at the United Nations’ official founding on June 26, 1945. But he had to resign his office the following day, after President Harry Truman, President Roosevelt’s successor, made it clear that he wanted to see Justice James F. Byrnes, his former mentor in the U.S. Senate, as his Secretary of State.

Stettinius accepted the position of U.S. representative to the United Nations and led the American delegation to the first United Nations General Assembly, which opened in London on January 10, 1946. Deeply committed to the success of the United Nations (a commitment which was one manifestation of his devotion to the political legacy of President Roosevelt), he nevertheless resigned this post too, in June 1946 – out of frustration with what he saw as President Truman’s failure to use the United Nations as a vehicle to resolve tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Stettinius retired to his family farm in Virginia and served for a time as rector of the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Within a short time, he became a business partner in a group which foresaw a need for a peacetime ship registry system administered by a private company. In 1948, International Registries, Inc. was established under Stettinius’s leadership with the Registered Agent Office in New York City, to register ships and corporations under the Liberian flag. 3

Troubled by charges of Roosevelt’s “betrayal” of American interests at the Yalta Conference, Stettinius decided to write a detailed and accurate insider’s account of that historic meeting to set the record straight. The resulting book, Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference was published after Stettinius died of a heart attack in February 1949. 4

Stettinius is remembered in Russia, along with President Roosevelt and his aide, Harry Hopkins, as one of the key figures who ensured American assistance to the Soviet Union in its fight for survival against Nazi attack. After decades of enforced silence regarding the scale of the American Lend-Lease program, the Russian translation of Stettinius’s 1944 book, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory, was published for the first time in Russia in 2000. 5

  1. Cit., The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance, by Ron Chernow, New York: Grove Press, 1990, pp. 188, 189.
  2. Stettinius, E.R. Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944.
  3. Cit. IRI Company Profile, retrieved from http://www.register-iri.com/content.cfm?catid=10
  4. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, Edited by Walter Johnson, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949; The Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement 4, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974, pp. 776-778; The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, “Edward Stettinius,” Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt, ed. by Allida Black, June Hopkins, et. al. (Hyde Park, New York: Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site, 2003). http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/stettinius-edward.htm (Accessed January 3, 2010); “Edward R. Stettinius Jr.” at http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/fdroosevelt/essays/cabinet/515
  5. Stettinius, E. Lend-Liz— Oruzhie Pobedy. Moskva: Veche, 2000.

Alexander Vassiliev’s Notes on Laurence Duggan’s File: A Comparison (Russian Original)

A Comparison Between Laurence Duggan’s KGB File in Alexander Vassiliev’s Yellow Notebook #2 and in His 1996 Draft Manuscript, The Sources in Washington


Alexander Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #2, pp. 4-10. Transcribed by Alexander Vassiliev, 2008. Posted at Woodrow Wilson Center website, 2009

Notes on Archival # 36857 vol.1 “Knyaz’ (“Prince”) Laurence Duggan

Alexander Vassiliev, draft chapter The Sources in Washington, pp. 14-19, 24; written in 1995-1996 for his first American co-author, Allen Weinstein; discovered by Jeff Kisseloff in Weinstein Papers at the Hoover Archive, May, 2007. [Александр Васильев, Источники в Вашингтоне, стр. 14-19, 24.] Citing Archival No.36857, vol.1 [Дело «Князя»]


p. 14

Симпатии вашингтонской интеллигенции к Советскому Союзу, мощные позиции компартии США, несомненно, создавали благоприятные возможности для работы НКВД и военной разведки. Однако имелась и оборотная сторона медали: источники различных резидентур и “негласные” коммунисты, поставлявшие информацию руководству КП США, действуя в одном оперативном поле, нередко сталкивались не только по официальной, но и по разведывательной работе, что приводило к взаимной расшифровке.


Yellow Notebook, p. 4

с.23 Записка «Рыжей» (приложение к письму от 26.4.36).

«Наш друг Эрнст сообщил мне в день перед отъездом в Европу следующую историю, о к-й он сам даст подробный отчет нашим друзьям за границей.

Приблизительно за неделю до его отъезда из Вашингтона к нему обратился Алджер Хисс. А. сообщил ему, что он коммунист, что он связан с организацией, работающей для Сов. Союза; и что ему известно, что у Эрнста тоже имеются связи, но он опасается, что они недостаточно прочные, и вероятно, его знания неправильно используются. Затем он прямо предложил Эрнсту дать отчет о лондонской конференции. В виду того, что они являются близкими друзьями, как говорит Э., он не отказался разговаривать с ним на эту тему, но сказал Алджеру, что он уже сделал доклад о конференции. Когда А., к-го я встретила через Э., как Вы, наверно, помните, настаивал на том, что, несмотря на это, ему хотелось бы получить этот отчет, Э. заявил, что ему придется снестись со своими «связями» и спросить их совета. Через день, «продумав» это, А. сказал, что он не будет настаивать на получении этого отчета, но что ему придется просить Э. поговорить с Ларри и Хелен относительно него, сказать им, кто он, и дать ему (А.) доступ к ним. Э. снова сказал, что он уже установил связь с Ларри и Хелен, но А. настаивал, что, несмотря на это, Э. должен поговорить с ними, что Э. и сделал. Он говорил с Ларри относительно А., и конечно, также и о себе самом, сказав ему, «в каком положении они находятся», «что основной задачей в настоящее время является защита Сов. Союза» и т.д., и т.д., «что каждый из них должен использовать свое благоприятное положение с целью оказать помощь в этом отношении». Ларри казался расстроенным, испуганным, заявил, что он не зашел настолько далеко, что пройдет нек-е время, пока он сможет сделать этот окончат-й шаг, что он все еще надеется проделать некоторую работу нормального порядка, реорганизовать свой отдел, постараться добиться каких-либо результатов в этом отношении и т.д. Очевидно, судя по словам Э., он не дал никаких обещаний, не поощрял А. к какой-либо деятельности, а, скорее, вежливо отступил. А. задал Э. также целый ряд др. в-сов, как, н-р, кто будет его приемником, что он из себя представляет, захочет ли Э. установить его связь с ним. Он также просил оказать ему содействие попасть в госуд. департамент, что Э., очевидно, и сделал.


Когда я указала Э. на то, какую ужасную недисциплинированность он проявил, какой опасности он подверг целесообразность его использования и всю работу, связывая между собой трех людей, он как будто ничего не понимал. Он полагал, что, «так как А. первый открыл свои карты, у него не могло быть оснований хранить все в тайне, кроме того, так как А. заявил, что «он делает это для «нас» и так как живет в Вашингтоне и поэтому не может встречаться с Ларри чаще, чем я сам, и наконец, так как я собираюсь уехать из страны на время, он считал, что лучше всего будет установить между ними контакт».

pp. 14-16

В апреле 1936 г. “Рыжая” составила следующую записку:

“Наш друг “Эрнст” сообщил мне в день перед отъездом в Европу следующую историю, о которой он сам даст подробный отчет нашим друзьям за границей.

Приблизительно за неделю до его отъезда из Вашингтона  к  нему обратился  Алджер Хисс12). Алджер сообщил ему, что он коммунист, что он связан с организацией, работающей для Советского Союза и что ему известно, что у “Эрнста” тоже имеются связи, но он опасается, что они (с.15) недостаточно прочные, и вероятно, его знания неправильно используются. Затем он прямо предложил “Эрнсту” дать отчет о лондонской конференции, В виду того, что они являются близкими друзьями, как говорит “Эрнст”, он не отказался разговаривать с ним на эту тему, но сказал Алджеру, что он уже сделал доклад о конференции. Когда Алджер, которого я встретила через “Эрнста”, как вы, наверно, помните, настаивал на том, что, несмотря на это, ему хотелось бы получить этот отчет, “Эрнст” заявил, что ему придется снестись со своими “связями” и спросит их совета. Через день, “продумав” это, Алджер сказал, что он не будет настаивать на получении этого отчета, но что ему придется просить “Эрнста” поговорить с Ларри и Хелен относительно него, сказать им. кто он, и дать ему (Адджеру) доступ к ним. “Эрнст” снова сказал, что он уже установил связь с Ларри и Хелен, но Алджер настаивал, что, несмотря на это, “Эрнст” должен поговорить с ними, что “Эрнст” и сделал. Он говорил с Ларри относительно Алджера, и конечно, также и о себе самом, сказав ему, “в каком положении они находятся”, “что основной задачей в настоящее время является защита Советского Союза” и т.д.,- что каждый из них должен использовать свое благоприятное положение с целью оказать помощь в этом отношении”. Ларри казался расстроенным, испуганным, заявил, что он не зашел настолько далеко, что пройдет некоторое время, пока он сможет сделать этот окончательный шаг, что он все еще надеется проделать некоторую работу нормального порядка, реорганизовать свой отдел, постараться добиться каких-либо результатов в этом отношении и т.д. Очевидно, судя по словам “Эрнста”, он не дал никаких обещаний, не поощрял Алджера к какой-либо деятельности, а, скорее, вежливо отступил. Алджер задал “Эрнсту” также целый ряд других вопросов, как, например, кто будет его приемником, что он из себя представляет, захочет ли “Эрнст” установить его связь с ним. Он также просил оказать ему содействие попасть в государственный департамент, что “Эрнст”, очевидно, и сделал.

Когда я указала “Эрнсту” на то, какую  ужасную недисциплинированность он проявил, какой опасности он подверг целесообразность его использования и всю работу, связывая между собой трех людей, он как будто ничего не понимал. Он полагал, что, “так как Алджер первый открыл свои карты, у него не могло быть оснований хранить все в тайне”, кроме того, так как Алджер заявил, что “он делает это для “нас” и так как живет в Вашингтоне и поэтому не может встречаться с Ларри чаще, чем я сам, и наконец, так как я собираюсь (стр. 16) уехать из страна на время, он считал, что лучше всего будет установить между ними контакт”1‘. (Там же, с.23).

Yellow Notebook#2, p. 4

c.21 Письмо «Норда» от 26.4.36

А. Хисс – «Юрист», Эрнст = «17»

(видный адвокат в Вашингтоне)

Yellow Notebook #2, p. 5

с.22 «Результат получился такой, что фактически «17» и Хисс открыто расшифрованы перед «19». «19», видимо, тоже ясно понимает природу «Рыжей». А Рыжая и Хисс более, чем пару месяцев тому назад, расшифровали сами себя друг другу.

Хелен Бойд – жена «19», присутствовавшая почти при всех этих встречах и разговорах, тоже несомненно в курсе дела и теперь знает столько, сколько сам «19-й»…

Я считаю, что после этой истории нам не следует форсировать обработку «19» и его жены. Видимо, помимо нас в этом направлении будет продолжать инициативу настойчивый Хисс.

На днях приезжает в Н-Й жена 19-го. Рыжая встретит ее здесь в порядке чисто дружественной встречи. При отъезде 17 из Вашингтона Хелен выразила большое желание повидаться снова с Рыжей. Возможно, Хелен расскажет Рыжей о настроениях мужа».


p. 16




Информируя Москву об этой неприятной истории 26 апреля 1936 г., Базаров писал: “Результат получился такой, что фактически “17” и Хисс открыто расшифрованы перед “19”. “19”, видимо, тоже ясно понимает природу “Рыжей”. А “Рыжая” и Хисс более, чем пару месяцев тому назад, расшифровали сами себя друг другу.

Хелен Бойд – жена “19”, присутствовавшая почти при всех этих встречах и разговорах, тоже несомненно в курсе дела и теперь знает столько, сколько сам “19-й”…

Я  считаю, что после этой истории нам не следует форсировать обработку “19” и его жены. Видимо, помимо нас в этом направлении будет продолжать инициативу настойчивый Хисс.

На днях приезжает в Нью-Йорк жена “19-го”, “Рыжая” встретит ее здесь в порядке чисто дружественной встречи. При отъезде “17” из Вашингтона Хелен выразила большое желание повидаться снова с “Рыжей”. Возможно, Хелен расскажет “Рыжей” о настроениях мужа”. (Там же, с.22).

Yellow Notebook #2, p. 5

с.24 ЦНЙ 3.5.36

«Нам непонятно, по каким мотивам Рыжая встретилась с «Юристом». Как мы понимаем, это имело место после нашей директивы о том, что «Юрист» – человек соседей и что от него нужно отойти. Такие эксперименты могут привести к нежелат-ельным результатам.

Очень просим установить такой порядок, когда ни один из Ваших людей ничего не предпринимает без Вашего ведома. Особенно это относится к Рыжей, зная ее недостатки, выражающиеся в «порывистости».

Теперь вопрос – как выбраться из этого клубка. 17 уехал, это его в известной степени изолирует, и о нем Юрист постепенно забудет.

Теперь относительно того – как спасти 19 и его жену. 19 может представлять интерес, считаясь с его положением в «Суррогате», его жена также, принимая во внимание ее связи. Отказаться от их обработки – это значит идти по линии наименьшего сопротивления. Поэтому нам представляется необходимым умело сгладить создавшееся положение и их обоих отвести от Юриста.

Как крайний исход, 19 мог бы сказать, что «помогает местным землякам и что последние предложили ему больше ни с кем не связываться». Наша вина в том, что 17, будучи уже нашим агентом, оставлен был на попечении Рыжей, к-я не в состоянии воспитывать не только агента, но и самое себя».

(Notation on the margin: «Суррогат» -Госдеп)

pp. 16-17

Естественно, Центру вся эта история очень не понравилась, однако разработку “19-го”, по его мнению, следовало продолжать. 3 мая 1936 г. Центр писал: “Нам непонятно, по каким мотивам “Рыжая” встретилась с “Юристом”. Как мы понимаем, это имело место после нашей директивы о том, что “Юрист” – человек соседей, и что от него нужно отойти. Такие эксперименты могут привести к нежелательным результатам.

Очень просим установить такой порядок, когда ни один из Ваших людей ничего не предпринимает без Вашего ведома. Особенно это относится к Рыжей, зная ее недостатки, выражающиеся в “порывистости”.

Теперь вопрос – как выбраться из этого клубка. 17” уехал, это его в известной мере изолирует, и о нем “Юрист” постепенно забудет.

Теперь относительно того – как спасти “19” и его жену. “19” может представить интерес, считаясь с его положением в “Суррогате”15, его жена также, принимая во внимание ее связи. Отказаться от их обработки – это значит идти по линии наименьшего сопротивления. Поэтому нам представляется необходимым умело сгладить создавшееся положение и их обоих отвести от Юриста.

Как крайний исход, 19 мог бы сказать, что “помогает местным землякам и что последние предложили ему больше ни с кем не связываться”. Наша вина в том, что ” 17″, будучи уже нашим агентом, оставлен был на попечении “Рыжей”, которая не в состоянии воспитывать не только агента, но и самое себя”. (Там же, с.24).

Ft. 15) «Суррогат» – Государственный департамент


Yellow Notebook#2, pp. 5-6

Письмо Юнга от 18.5.36

«Рыжая» встретила «Юриста» за все время ее пребывания в этой стране только один раз, причем это было зимой. Она пошла на эту встречу с ведома т.Норда. После того, как Вы нас известили, что он имеет с соседями связь, мы его, т.е. «Юриста», не встречали…

«Ю.» после встречи с «Рыжей» в квартире нашего 17 и беседы с ней, несомненно, сообщил своему начальству об этой встрече. По случайному совпадению, работник по братской  организации, связанный с «Юристом», хорошо знал «Рыжую» еще с тех пор, когда последняя была связана с братской линией. К этому братскому работнику, к-й нам известен как «Питер», мы иногда в крайне необходимых случаях обращались через «Рыжую» за помощью. Этот «Питер» тот самый братский работник, о к-м я Вам докладывал устно, будучи дома. В необходимых для нас случаях по делам только сертификатов о натурализации мы прибегаем к помощи этого «Питера».

Этот самый Питер при одной из редких встреч с «Рыжей» заявил последней: «Вы в Ваш-не наткнулись на моего парня (имелся в виду «Юрист»), Вы лучше не накладывайте на него руку и пр…» И, видимо, Питер, предлагая в свою очередь, Юристу не развивать связь с Рыжей, сделал это не очень ловко, т.е. так, что Юрист понял более или менее природу «Рыжей».

p. 17

Обстоятельства знакомства “Рыжей” и “Юриста” прояснил Ицхак Ахмеров в письме от 18 мая 1936 г.: “”Рыжая” встретила “Юриста” за все время ее пребывания в этой стране только один раз, причем это было зимой. Она пошла на эту встречу с ведома т.Норда, После того, как Вы нас известили, что он имеет с соседями связь, мы его, т.е. “Юриста”, не встречали…

“Юрист” после встречи с “Рыжей” в квартире нашего “17” и беседы с ней, несомненно, сообщил своему начальству об этой встрече. По случайному совпадению, работник по братской организации, связанный с “Юристом”, хорошо знал “Рыжую” еще с тех пор, когда последняя была связана с братской линией. К этому братскому работнику, который нам известен как “Питер”, мы иногда в крайне необходимых случаях обращались через “Рыжую” за помощью. Этот “Питер” тот самый братский работник, о котором я Вам докладывал устно, будучи дома. В необходимых для нас случаях по делам только сертификатов о натурализации мы прибегаем к помощи этого “Питера”.

Этот самый “Питер” при одной из редких встреч с “Рыжей” заявил последней: “Вы в Вашингтоне наткнулись на моего парня (имелся в виду “Юрист”), Вы лучше не накладывайте на него руку и пр…” И, видимо, “Питер”, предлагая, в свою очередь, “Юристу” не развивать связь с “Рыжей”, сделал это не очень ловко, т.е. так, что “Юрист” понял более или менее природу “Рыжей””. (Там же, с.25).


с.27 Юнг – Ц 18.05.36

«В связи с Вашим указанием продолжать обработку 19 и его жены, мы задержали на нек-е время отъезд Рыжей к мужу. Жена 19 и Рыжая 16 мая с.г. имели встречу. Эта встреча не пошла дальше более или менее дружеских разговоров на общие темы. Она пригласила Рыжую в конце недели в Вашингтон. Примерно через неделю Р-я поедет к ним на несколько дней с целью продвинуть это знакомство до чего-либо более конкретного».

В то время Геда Гумперц уже собиралась вернуться в Европу к мужу, но Базаров задержал ее в Америке в связи с указанием Центра продолжать разработку 19”-го. 16 мая она встретилась с Хелен Бойд, однако дальше дружеской болтовни на общие темы беседа не пошла. Впрочем, Хелен вновь пригласила “Рыжую” посетить их а Вашингтоне, и через пару недель Геда Гумперц воспользовалась приглашением “с целью продвинуть это знакомство до чего-либо более конкретного”. (Там же, с.27).

Yellow Notebook#2, pp. 6-7

с.30 Сообщение «Норда» о поездке к «19».

«После разговора по разным в-сам, касающимся стран его департамента (каковые в-сы были даны Рыжей с тем, чтобы показать 19 интерес к в-сам его круга деятельности) 19 сообщил, что за неделю примерно до этого визита к нему обратился некто Фред Фильд (из Форейн Полиси Ассосиэйшен), являющийся его школьным товарищем, и просил его снабжать его регулярно информацией как полит., так и др. порядка.

(О Фр. Фильде Вам в прошлом была послана краткая записка, составленная Рыжей. Это очень богатый человек, занимающийся полит-ми в-сами. Видимо, принадлежит к «Вашингтонской группе левых».)


Перед его визитом «Юрист» звонил 19 и просил последнего принять Фильда и поговорить с ним. (Юрист знает «19» по столичному кружку защитников политики «Нью Дил».) 19 сообщил Рыжей, что он не дал никакого ответа Фильду и отложил его до ее приезда (о чем 19 был информирован заблаговременно)…

19 далее сообщил, что для него милее связь не с Фильдом не потому, что она и безопаснее, но и потому, что, будучи связанным непосредственно с нами (нашу страну он назвал по имени) он может быть более полезным. 19 далее сообщил, что в основном ему его линия совершенно ясна, что его удерживает на опостылой ему работе в департаменте, где он по 2 недели не вылазит из смокинга, каждый вечер бывая на приеме (у него чуть не 20 стран в отделе) – это мысль быть полезным нашему делу. Он сообщил, что он сидит еще не совсем крепко в седле, не ко всему еще имеет доступ. Многие завидуют его необыкновенной карьере, столь неожиданной в его годы (ему 32-33 года), но пройдет несколько месяцев, и он укрепит свое положение. Верно, что он широко известен, как либерал, как типичный нью-диловец, и семья известна своим либерализмом. Но это не беда. Безопасности ради он просил встречаться с ним 1 раз в месяц, и очень бы хотел, чтобы наш человек мог бы стенографировать. Сейчас он не может еще давать док-тов, но позже, видимо, это ему удастся. Кроме английского, он владеет испанским.

Просил жене ничего не говорить о его работе, и проявил понимание техники связи…

На связь с 19 ставлю «Гранита, у к-го есть язык и нет никакого опыта. Сумеет найти тон – связь удержим. Не сумеет – постараюсь умело отступить до возможности дачи 19 другому работнику.

pp. 18-19:

О поездке “Рыжей” к семейству Дагганов Базаров сообщал в Москву:

“После разговоров по разным вопросам, касающимся стран его департамента (каковые вопросы были даны Рыжей с тем, чтобы показать 19 интерес к вопросам его круга деятельности/1 9*сообщил, что за неделю примерно до этого визита к нему обратился некто Фред Фильд (из Форейн Полиси Ассосиэйшен), являющийся его школьным товарищем, и просил  его снабжать его регулярно информацией как политического, так и другого порядка.

(О Фр. Фильде Вам в прошлом была послана краткая записка, составленная Рыжей. Это очень богатый человек, занимающийся политическими вопросами. Видимо, принадлежит к “Вашингтонской группе левых4.)

Перед его визитом “Юрист” звонил 19 и просил последнего принять Фильда и поговорить с ним. (“Юрист” знает “19” по столичному кружку защитников политики “Нью Дил”.) “19” сообщил “Рыжей”, что он не дал никакого ответа Фильду и отложил его до ее приезда (о чем 19 был информирован заблаговременно)…

19” далее сообщил, что для него милее связь с Фильдом не потому, что они и безопаснее [sic in Vassiliev’s], но и потому, что, будучи связанным непосредственно с нами (нашу страну он назвал по имени), он может быть более полезным. “19” далее сообщил, что в основном ему его линия совершенно ясна, что его удерживает на опостылой ему работе в департаменте, где он по 2 недели не вылазит из смокинга, каждый вечер бывая на приеме (у него чуть не 20 стран в отделе), – это мысль быть полезным нашему делу. Он сообщил, что он сидит еще не совсем крепко в седле, не ко всему еще имеет доступ. Многие завидуют его необыкновенной карьере, столь неожиданной в его годы (ему 32-33 года), но пройдет несколько месяцев, и он укрепит свое положение. Верно, что он широко известен, как либерал, как типичный нью-диловец, и семья известна своим либерализмом. Но это не беда. Безопасности ради он просил встречаться с ним 1 раз в месяц, и очень хотел бы, чтобы наш человек мог бы стенографировать. Сейчас он не может еще давать документов, но позже, видимо, это ему удастся. Кроме английского, он владеет испанским.

Просил жене ничего не говорить о его работе, и проявил понимание 1 техники связи.,.

На связь с “19″ ставлю Гранита”, у которого есть язык и нет никакого опыта. Сумеет найти тон – связь удержим. Не сумеет -постараюсь умело отступить до возможности дачи “19” другому работнику”. (Там же, с.30).


Юнг занят «13» и должен быть готов всегда заменить меня в Ваш-не по моим линиям, в твердом касательстве с «10».

с.31 Справка от 13.7.36

«Рыжая» выехала в Париж и больше в аппарате Норда не работает».

Псевдоним “Гранит” принадлежал начинающему “нелегалу” Норману Бородину14, который в США жил под именем Джордж Райан. В силу занятости более опытный Ицхак Ахмеров не мог принять на связь Лоуренса Даггана, а Геда Гумперц летом 1936 г. выехала в Париж. (Там же,с.31).

По всей видимости, Г. Гумперц, отчитываясь перед Базаровым о своей беседе с Дагганом, или Базаров, информируя о ней Москву, преувеличили степень готовности Лоуренса сотрудничать с советской разведкой.

p. 9

с.49 “Норд” – Ц 28.11.36

[Послал справочник ГД, вышедший в ноябре 36 г.] “В нем работники до “офицеров” включительно. Поэтому 12 там

p. 10

нет. 11-го вы найдете в начале справочника, равно как и 19 и очень многих из наших “корреспондентов”…

В справочнике фотографическом вы еще не найдете соседского “Юриста”, ибо он работает с сентября. “19”-й сообщил, что Ю. – это тот человек, к-й на своем столе имеет все важное из всех отделов и должен быть одним из наиболее информированных людей в Суррогате”.


с.51 Письмо “Норда” от 29.11.36

“”19” добросовестно дает, что может. Но пока что это немного, если не сказать, что очень и очень мало. Его справочный мат-л сыграл для нас очень большую роль и еще очень и очень пригодится в будущем.

С прошлой почтой (через Кармен) мы послали вам большой список установок – данные “19”. С этой – шлем первое дополнение к нему. Мне кажется, что через нек-х из этих наводок можно прийти к ценным людям. Но нужен подходящий вербовщик. А его нет. Был, вот, “Юрист” – подходящий, да соседи урвали, как вы сообщали. (Впрочем, имея Ю-та, особенно другие и не нужны.) Через Мишеля найти – отпадает….

p.  24


… В-конце ноября Базаров отправил в Центр полученный от Даггана только что вышедший справочник госдепартамента, отметив: “В нем работники до “офицеров” включительно. Поэтому “12” там нет. “11”-го вы найдете в начале справочника, равно как и “19” и очень многих из наших “корреспондентов”11. (Там же, с. 49).








При этом Базаров написал: “”19” добросовестно дает, что может. Но пока что это немного, если не сказать, что очень и очень мало. Его справочный материал сыграл для нас очень большую роль и еще очень и очень пригодится в будущем.

С прошлой почтой (через “Кармен”) мы послали вам большой список установок – данные “19”. С этой шлем первое дополнение к нему. Мне кажется, что через некоторых из этих наводок можно прийти к ” ценным людям. Но нужен подходящий вербовщик. А его нет. Был, вот, “Юрист” – подходящий, да соседи урвали, как вы сообщали. (Впрочем, имея “Юриста”, особенно другие и не нужны.) Через “Мишеля” найти –отпадает… (Там же, стр. 51.)


Alexander Vassiliev’s Notes on Laurence Duggan’s File: A Comparison

A Look at the Laurence Duggan’s KGB File in Alexander Vassiliev’s Yellow Notebook #2 and in his 1996 Draft Manuscript, “The Sources in Washington”

One of the recurrent themes in the heated debates which followed the publication in spring 2009 of  Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, by John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, has been that, with the surfacing of Alexander Vassiliev’s notes on selected KGB files, the landmark Hiss Case is finally closed. This conclusion – and, in fact, the first chapter in the book – rests upon an assertion that Vassiliev’s notes provided “new details about Hiss’s relationship with Soviet intelligence.” 1

The earliest dated episode in Vassiliev’s corpus of evidence appears in Vassiliev’s notes on a few spring 1936 reports and communiqués from the file of Laurence Duggan, a State Department official and a long-time Soviet target and reluctant source. The notes on Duggan’s file now appear in Vassiliev’s Yellow Notebook #2. In 1999, summaries or verbatim citations of the same documents also appeared in The Haunted Wood 2, the first book based on Vassiliev’s notes.

How could this duplication occur, if Allen Weinstein, Vasiliev’s first American co-author, only had access to “sanitized summaries of major topics and themes” that Vassiliev had prepared for him in 1995 and1996? 3 Yet this limited access is all Weinsten had, according to Vassiliev’s second American co-authors, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr.

The answer to this puzzle lies in one of the so-called “sanitized summaries” — Vassiliev’s dense, 240-page Russian manuscript, entitled The Sources in Washington (“Istochniki v Vashingtone”). According to an attached note, the manuscript was submitted to Allen Weinstein for translation in late 1996. 4 This manuscript was among draft chapters by Vassiliev that he had not submitted to the SVR declassification commission .

Let us see how “sanitized” Vassiliev’s 1996 account actually was – and whether his notes on the same documents add any important new details.

We should also see if Haynes and Klehr’s assertion, in their Provenance file posted on the Woodrow Wilson Center website, holds up – namely, that in Vassiliev’s “summaries” for Allen Weinstein, “with some exceptions, real names and identifying information about sources could not be disclosed, only their cover names, and certain matters could not be discussed at all.” Does this accord with Vassiliev’s 1996 account?

Vassiliev’s notes are reproduced here in the 2007 translation posted on the Woodrow Wilson Center website – and in the excerpts from Vassiliev’s draft manuscript that I translated from the Russian in the summer of 2007. Let’s compare the two.

Alexander Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #2, pp. 4-7, translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev (1993-1996). 5 Translated by Philip Redko, reviewed and edited by Alexander Vassiliev and John Earl Haynes (2007). Citing Archival # 36857 v. 1 “Prince” Laurence

Alexander Vassiliev, draft manuscript, The Sources in Washington, pp. 14-19, citing Archival No. 36857, vol.1; Laurence Duggan file. (Original in Russian, translation by Svetlana Chervonnaya, 2007.)

The same episode appears in The Haunted Wood (1999), pp. 5-8.


<The Sources in Washington manuscript> p. 14

The sympathies of Washington intellectuals towards the Soviet Union, CPUSA strength [in mid-1930s – S.Ch.], undoubtedly created favorable opportunities for the work of the NKVD and military intelligence. However, there was a reverse side of the coin: the sources of different residencies and “non-disclosed” [“neglasnye” – an opposite of “glasnyi,” which reminds one of l Gorbachov’s “Glasnost”] Communists who were providing information for the leadership of the CPUSA [and were] active in the same operational field, often came in contact not only in their official capacity, but also in intelligence work, which resulted in mutual disclosure [“rasshifrovka,” verbatim for decryption].

p. 4

p.23  Note from “Redhead” (appended to a letter dated 26.4.36).

“Our friend Ernst, the day before he left for Europe, related to me the following incident, of which he himself will give a detailed account to our friends overseas.

Roughly a week before his departure from Washington, he was approached by Alger Hiss. A. informed him that he is a Communist, that he has ties to an organization working for the Sov. Union; and that he is aware that Ernst has ties as well; however, he fears that they are not robust enough and that his knowledge is probably being misused. Then he bluntly proposed that Ernst give an account of the London conference. Because they are, as E. puts it, close friends, he did not refuse to discuss this topic with him, but he told Alger that he had already delivered a report on that conference. When A., whom, as you probably recall, I met through E., insisted that he would like to receive that report himself regardless, E. said that he would have to contact his “connections” and ask their advice. Within a day, having “thought it over,”

A. said that he would not insist on receiving the report himself, but that he will have to ask E. to speak with Larry and Helen about him and to tell them who he is and give him (A.) access to them. Once more, E. said that he had already established a connection with Larry and Helen, but A. insisted that E. would have to speak with them regardless, which E. did. He spoke with Larry about A., and of course about himself as well, telling him “in what situation they found themselves,” “that their main task at present is the defense of the Sov. Union,” etc., etc., and “that each of them has to use his advantageous position in order to provide assistance in this matter.” Larry seemed upset and frightened and said that he had not gone so far yet, that some time would pass before he would be able to take such an irrevocable step, and that he is still hoping to do some work of a conventional sort, reorganizing his department and trying to achieve some kind of results in this regard, etc. Obviously, judging by what E. said, he gave no promises and did not prod A. to take action of any kind; instead, he politely backed down. A. also asked E. a whole series of oth. quest-s, e.g., who would be his successor,12 what kind of a person he is, and whether E. would want to establish his connection with him. He also asked him to help him in getting into the State Department, which E. apparently did.


When I pointed out to E. what a terrible lack of discipline he had shown and what a danger he had created for the value of his use and for the whole enterprise by linking three people with each other, he acted as if he did not understand. He believed that “because A. had been the first to show his cards, he did not have a reason to keep everything secret, moreover, because A. had said that he “is doing this for ‘us’ and because he is living in Washington and therefore cannot meet with Larry more often than I myself can, and finally, because I intend to leave the country for a while, he thought the best thing would be to establish contact between them.”

pp. 14-16

In April 1936, “Redhead” wrote the following memo: “Our friend “Ernest” reported to me on the day prior to his departure for Europe the following story, about which he himself would  report to our friends while abroad.

Approximately a week before his departure from Washington, Alger Hiss [1] had approached him. Alger told him that he was a Communist, that he was connected with an organization working for the Soviet Union, and that he knew that “Ernest” also had connections, although he feared that they were not solid enough, [and] that his knowledge was being used inappropriately. Then he straightforwardly suggested that “Ernest” provide a report on the London conference. According to “Ernest,” since they were close friends he did not refuse to talk to him about this topic, but told Alger that he had already made a report on the conference. When Alger, whom, as you may perhaps remember, I met through “Ernest,” insisted that he would still like to receive this report, “Ernest” stated that he would have to contact his “connections” and ask for their advice.

In a day, having thought it over, Alger said that he would not insist upon the receipt of this report, but that he would have to ask “Ernest” to talk to Larry and Helen about him, to tell them who he was and to give him (Alger) access to them. “Ernest” again said that he had already established contact with Larry and Helen, but Alger insisted that, this notwithstanding, “Ernest” should talk to them again, which “Ernest” did. He talked to Larry about Alger and, of course, about himself, having told him “in what situation they found themselves” and “that the major task at present was the defense of the Soviet Union,” etc., [and] that each of them should use his favorable situation for the purpose of providing assistance in this respect.” Larry seemed distraught, frightened, and said that he had not gone that far, that it would take some time before he would be able to take this final step, that he still hoped to do certain work in the normal way, to reorganize his department, to try to achieve some results in this respect, etc. It is obvious, according to “Ernest”’s own account, that he has not made any promises, had not encouraged Alger [to take] any action, but, more likely, has politely stepped back. Alger also asked “Ernest” a whole series of other questions, for instance, who would be his successor, [and] whether “Ernest” would like to establish contact with him. He also asked him to help him get into the Department of State, which “Ernest” obviously has done.

When I pointed out to “Ernest” what a terrible breach of discipline he had committed, how he had jeopardized the advisability of his [own] use and all [our] work by connecting these three people, he seemed not to understand anything. He assumed that “since Alger was the first to show his cards, he had no reason to keep it all  secret;” besides, since Alger said that “he was doing this for ‘us,’ and since he lived in Washington and for this reason could not meet Larry more often than I myself [could], and, finally, since I was going to leave the country for some time, he thought that it would be best  to establish contact between them.” (Ibid., p. 23).

pp. 4-5

p.21 Letter from “Nord” dated 26.4.36

A. Hiss – “Jurist,” Ernst = “17” (a prominent attorney in Washington)

p. 22 “The outcome is that ‘17’ and Hiss have, in effect, been completely deprived of their cover before ‘19.’ Evidently, ‘19’ also clearly understands the identity of ‘Redhead.’ And more than a couple of months ago, Redhead and Hiss also got exposed to each other.

Helen Boyd – ‘19’s’ wife, having been present at almost all of these meetings and discussions, is undoubtedly clued in as well, and now knows as much as ‘19’ himself…

I think that in light of this incident, we should not accelerate the cultivation of ‘19’ and his wife. It seems that apart from us, the persistent Hiss will continue his initiative in that direction.

19’s wife will be arriving in NY any day now. Redhead will meet her here for a purely friendly meeting. Upon 17’s departure from Washington, Helen expressed a great desire to see Redhead again. It is possible that Helen will tell Redhead about her husband’s frame of mind.”

p. 16


Informing Moscow about this unpleasant story on April 26 1936, Bazarov wrote: “The result was that ‘17’ and Hiss have, in fact, been openly deciphered [“rasshifrovany] before ‘19’. ‘19’ probably clearly understands ‘Redhead’’s nature. And ‘Redhead’ and Hiss have deciphered  themselves [revealed their true nature – S.Ch.]to each other more than two months ago.

“Helen Boyd – the wife of ‘19’, who was present at almost all these meetings and conversations, is undoubtedly also aware of all this business and now knows as much as ‘19th’ himself…

“I think that after this incident we should not force the cultivation of ‘19’ and his wife. It is possible that besides us, the persistent Hiss will continue his initiative in that direction.

The wife of ‘“19th’ is coming to New York one of these days. ‘Redhead’ will meet her here in a purely friendly way. On the departure of ‘ “17th’ from Washington, Helen expressed a great desire to see ‘Redhead’ again. It is possible that Helen will tell ‘Redhead’ about her husband’s mood.” (Ibid., p. 22)


p. 5

p.24 C – to NY 3.5.36

“We fail to see for what reason Redhead met with ‘Jurist.’ As we understand it, this took place after our directive stipulating that ‘Jurist’ is the neighbors’ man and that it is necessary to stay away from him. Experiments of this sort could have undesirable consequences.

We strongly urge you to arrange it so that none of your people undertakes anything without your consent. This applies in particular to Redhead, bearing in mind her shortcomings, as manifested in her ‘impetuousness.’

Now for the question – how to get out of this mess. 17 departed, this isolates him to a certain extent, and Jurist will gradually forget about him.

Now with regard to how to save 19 and his wife. 19 could be of interest, considering his position in the ‘Surrogate’; his wife as well, considering her connections. To refuse to cultivate them means going down the path of least resistance. Therefore it is essential that we skillfully smooth over the emerging situation and steer both of them away from Jurist.

As a last resort, 19 could say that ‘he is helping the local fellowcountrymen and that the latter suggested to him that he not get involved with anyone else.’

We are to blame for the fact that 17, being already our agent, was left in the hands of Redhead, who is ill-suited to handle either an agent or even herself.”

(Notation on the margin: «Surrogate» –Department of State)

pp. 16-17


Naturally, the Center did not like the whole story, however, it thought that the cultivation of  “19th” should be continued. On May 3, 1936, the Center wrote:

“We do not understand the motives behind ‘Redhead’’s meeting with ‘Jurist’. As we understand, this took place after our instructions that ‘Jurist’ was the neighbors’ man, and that he should be kept at a distance. Such experiments may produce unfavorable results.

We strongly suggest that you establish a procedure whereby none of your people will take any steps without your knowledge. This is especially true in the case of ‘Redhead,’ in view of her drawbacks, which are evident in her impulsiveness [outbursts].

The question now is how to get out of this tangled web. ‘17 ’ has left, and this isolates him to some extent, and ‘Jurist’ will gradually forget about him.

“Now, on how to save ‘19’ and his wife. ‘19 ’ may be of interest, considering his position at the ‘Surrogate,’ (15);  his wife as  well, considering her connections. To refuse to cultivate them is taking the path of least resistance. Hence, we think it is necessary to cleverly smooth the resulting situation and steer them both away from ‘Jurist.’

“As a last resort, ‘19’ might say that he ‘was assisting the local compatriots, and that the latter have suggested that he not contact anyone else.’

“It is our fault that ‘17,’ who had already been our agent, was left in the custody of ‘Redhead,’ who is unable to educate not only an agent, but [even] herself.” (Ibid., p. 24.)

Vassiliev’s footnote (15) is illegible. “Surrogate” was an earlier name for the Department of State. [In the 1940s, it was called “Bank.”]

pp. 5-6

p.25 Letter from Jung dated 18.5.36

““Redhead” met “Jurist” on only one occasion during the entire time of her stay in this country, in the winter. She went to this meeting at the behest of Cde. Nord. After you informed us that he (i.e., “Jurist”) has ties with the neighbors, we did not meet with him…

After meeting with “Redhead” and speaking with her in our 17’s apartment, “J.” no doubt informed his superiors about the meeting. By random coincidence, an operative at our fraternal organization, who is connected to “Jurist,” knew “Redhead” well since the time that the latter was connected with the fraternal line. When it proved absolutely necessary, we occasionally went through “Redhead” to solicit help from this fraternal operative, who is known to us as “Peter.” This “Peter” is the same fraternal operative whom I described to you orally when I was home. When the need arises for us in cases involving only certificates of naturalization, we resort to this “Peter” for help.


This same Peter, during one of his rare meetings with “Redhead,” said the following: “In Wash-n you stumbled across my buddy (meaning “Jurist”), you had better keep your hands off him, etc…” And apparently Peter, when suggesting in turn to “Jurist” that he not develop ties with Redhead, handled it rather ineptly, i.e., in such a way that Jurist more or less understood “Redhead’s” identity.

p. 17

The circumstances of the meeting between “Redhead” and “Jurist” were ascertained by Iskhak Akhmerov in his letter from 18 May, 1936: “‘Redhead’ had met ‘Jurist’ only once during the entire time of her stay in this country, and this took place in winter. She went to that meeting with c.[omrade] Nord’s knowledge. After you had informed us that [‘Jurist’] has a contact [“svyaz’] with the neighbors, we did not see him, that is ‘Jurist’…. After his meeting with ‘Redhead’ in the apartment of our ‘17th’ and a conversation with her, ‘Jurist’ no doubt informed his superiors about this meeting. By coincidence, a worker from a fraternal organization, who is connected with ‘Jurist,’ had known ‘Redhead’ well since the time when the latter was connected with the fraternal line. We sometimes, in case of urgent need, turn to this fraternal worker [bratskij rabotnik], who is known to us as ‘Peter,’ for  assistance, approaching him through ‘Redhead.’ This ‘Peter’ is that very fraternal worker about whom I reported to you orally back at home. In case of need we resort to the assistance of this ‘Peter,’ solely in cases concerning certificates of naturalization.

“This is the same ‘Peter’ who, during one of his rare meetings with ‘Redhead,’ told her: ‘If in Washington you have come across my guy (meaning ‘Jurist’), you had better not lay your hand on him, etc….’ Probably ‘Peter,’ when urging ‘Jurist,’ in his turn, not to develop contact with ‘Redhead,’, did it in a clumsy way, so that ‘Jurist’ more or less understood the nature of  ‘Redhead.’” (Ibid., p. 25).

p. 6

p.27 Jung – C 18.05.36

“In connection with your directive to proceed with the cultivating of 19 and his wife, we for the time being have delayed Redhead’s departure to her husband’s house.13 19’s wife and Redhead had a meeting on 16 May of this year. The meeting did not move beyond more or less friendly discussions about general topics. She invited Redhead to Washington at the end of the week. In about a week, Redhead will visit them for a few days in order to move theiracquaintance to a more concrete level.”

p. 17

At that time, Hede Gumpertz was already about to return to Europe to her husband, but Bazarov had kept her in America in connection with the Center’s instructions to continue the cultivation of “19th.” On May 16, she met with Helen Boyd, but the conversation did not go beyond general topics. Nonetheless, Helen again invited “Redhead” to visit them in Washington, and in a couple of weeks Hede Gumperz accepted the invitation, “with the purpose of promoting this acquaintance into something more concrete.” (Ibid., p. 27).

pp. 6-7

p.30 Report by “Nord” regarding the trip to “19”.

“After a discussion about different matters regarding the countries in his department (the same matters that were given to Redhead to demonstrate to 19 an interest in matters pertaining to his sphere of work), 19 reported that around a week before this visit he had been approached by a certain Fred Field (from the Foreign Policy Association), who had been a schoolmate of his, asking him to provide him regularly with information both polit. and other.

(A short note about Fred Field, compiled by Redhead, was sent to you in the past. He is a very wealthy man who follows polit. matters. Apparently, he belongs to the “Washington group of leftists”).

Prior to his visit, “Jurist” called 19 and asked him to receive Field and speak with him. (Jurist knows “19” through the capital’s circle of supporters of “New Deal” policies.) 19 informed Redhead that he had not given Field any sort of reply and was putting it aside until her arrival (of which 19 was informed ahead of time)…

19 then reported that he would favor not having a connection with Field, not because it would be more secure, but because he, by being linked directly with us (he identified our country by name), can be of greater value. 19 further reported that overall his line of action is completely clear to him and that the only thing that induces him to stay in a job he despises in the department, having to wear a dinner jacket for 2 weeks at a time when attending a reception every evening (with nearly 20 countries in his division), is the notion of being useful to our cause. He reported that he is not quite firm in the saddle yet and does not yet have access to everything. Many envy his extraordinary career, a career highly unusual for one of his age (he is 32-33), but after several months he will consolidate his position.


It is true that he is widely known as a liberal and a typical New Dealer and that his family is known for its liberalism. But this is not a problem. To be on the safe side, he asked that we meet with him once a month and would very much like our man to make shorthand notes of the meetings. He is unable to give us documents for now, but later, apparently, he will manage it. In addition to English, he knows Spanish. He asked that his wife not be told about his work, and demonstrated an understanding of the techniques of liaison…

For the liaison with 19, I am assigning “Granite,” who knows the lingo but has no experience of any sort. If he can find the right tone – we will preserve the connection. If he cannot – I will try to back away gracefully until such time that we are able to assign 19 to a different operative.

Jung is busy with “13” and must always be prepared to replace me in Wash-ton on all my lines, in close conjunction with “10”.

p.31 Report dated 13.7.36

““Redhead” left for Paris and no longer works in Nord’s division.”

pp. 17-18

Bazarov reported [the following] to Moscow on  “Redhead”’s trip to the Duggans’: “After conversation about various matters regarding the countries in his department (pursuant to the [list of] questions given to ‘Redhead’ to demonstrate  to ‘19’ an interest in his field of activity), ‘19’ said that approximately a week before this visit, he had been approached by one Fred Field (from the Foreign Policy Association), who had been a school friend and who asked him to provide information of both a political and other nature on a regular basis.

“(Concerning Fr. Field we sent you a brief memo in the past, compiled by ‘Redhead.’ This is a very rich man, involved in political issues. Probably, he belongs to the ‘Washington group of leftists.’)

“Prior to his visit, ‘Jurist’ telephoned ‘19’ and asked the latter to receive Field and to talk to him. (‘Jurist’ knows ‘19’ from a circle [study group] of defenders of New Deal policies in the capital.) ‘19’ told ‘Redhead’ that he had not given any reply to Field and was postponing [that] until her arrival (about which ‘19th’ had been informed beforehand)…

“ ‘19’ further said that his preference is not to be in contact with Field,  not because it would be more secure, but because, if directly in contact with us (he named our country by name), he might be more useful. ‘19’ went on to report that in general his line [of action] is crystal clear to him, that the only thought that keeps him in his job at the Department, of which he is sick and tired, when for 2 weeks running he does not take off a tuxedo, attending receptions daily (he has almost 20 countries in his department) — is the thought of being of use to our cause. He said that he was not quite steady in the saddle yet and that he did not yet have access to everything. Many envy his extraordinary career, so unusual at his age (he is 32-33 years old), but in a few months he will establish himself in his position.

“True, he is widely known as a liberal, as a typical New Dealer, and his family is known for its liberalism. However, this is not a problem. For  purposes of security, he asked that we meet with him once a month, and he would very much like our man to be able to take shorthand notes. At this point he cannot give us documents yet, but he might manage to do that later. “Besides English, he knows Spanish. “He asked us not to tell his wife anything about his work, and showed an understanding of communication techniques. …

“I am detailing ‘Granite’as a contact with ‘19,’ who knows the language but has no experience. If he manages to find the right tone, we’ll maintain this contact. If not – I’ll try to carefully retreat until [there is a chance] to transfer ‘19’ to another worker.” (Ibid., p. 30).

The pseudonym “Granite” belonged to a beginner “illegal” named Norman Borodin, who had lived in the US as George Ryan. Being very busy, the more experienced Iskhak Akhmerov could not take on Laurence Duggan as a contact, and Heda Gumpertz left for Paris in summer 1936. (Ibid., p. 31).

p. 34


p.258 Report by “Granite” (Norman Borodin) dated 8.03.48

“The story of agent 19’s recruitment is as follows: Around the end of 1935 or the beginning of 1936 (I can’t remember the exact date), agent “Redhead” gave us a lead on her acquaintance, ‘19’, telling us that he was sympathetic toward the Soviet Union and the American Comparty. She agreed with him that the Communist George Ryan (George Ryan) would come to Washington from NY to discuss, or rather, receive information about the situation in the State Dep., where he was working at the time as Chief of the Latin American Division. After some hesitation, 19 agreed to meet once. I left for Washington soon after, along with the station chief, ‘Nord’.

p. 19

By all appearances, G. [sic in Russian – S.Ch.] Gumpertz, reporting to Bazarov on her conversation with Duggan, or Bazarov, informing Moscow about it, had overestimated Laurence’s readiness to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. Norman Borodin learned this first hand, for in his reference dated March 8, 1948, he would describe his first meetings with “19th” in the following way: “The story of the recruitment of agent ‘19’ is the following: approximately in late 1935 or early 1936 (I do not remember the exact date), agent ‘Redhead’ gave us a talent- spotting of her acquaintance – ‘19’ — telling us that he feels sympathy for the Soviet Union and the American CP. She arranged with him that Communist George Ryan would come to him from New York to talk, or, more precisely, to consult on the situation at the Department of State, where  he worked at that time as head of the Latin-American department.

pp 9-10

p.49 “Nord” – C 28.11.36

[Sent the SD directory published in November ’36.] “It lists officials up to and including “officers.” This is why 12 is  not in it. You will find 11 at the start of the directory, along with 19 and a great many of our “correspondents”… You will not find the neighbors’ “Jurist” in the photograph directory because he has worked there only since September. “19” reported that J. is the one who has everything important from every division on his desk, and must be one of the best-informed people at the Surrogate.”


p.51    Letter from “Nord” dated 29.11.36

“19” conscientiously gives what he can. However, as of now this does not amount to very much and indeed is very, very little. … In a past mailing (through Carmen), we sent you a long list of talent spottings given to us by “19”. In today’s mail we are sending the first supplement to it. It seems to me that some of these talent spottings could lead to valuable people. However, we need a suitable recruiting agent. We don’t have one. There was “Jurist” (they didn’t have him), but the neighbors snatched him up, as you informed us. (Indeed, if we had J-st, no one else would really be needed). …

p. 24


In late November, Bazarov sent to the Center the newly printed State Department Directory with his [Bazarov’s] note, “It lists employees up to and including ‘officers.’ For this reason, you won’t find ‘12th there. You will find ‘11th’ in the beginning of the Directory, as well as ‘19th’ and many of our correspondents.” (Ibid., p. 49)






Bazarov went on to write, “ ‘19’ is honestly providing what he can. However, thus far, it is very little, in fact, very, very little. … In the last mail (via ‘Carmen’), we sent you a long list of orientations [“ustanovki”, that is, talent spottings] – data from ‘19.’ With this mail, we are sending you an addition to it. It seems to me, that some of these spottings [“navodok”] might lead to valuable people. However, we need a suitable recruiter. And we do not have one. There used to be ‘Jurist’ – suitable, but the neighbors snatched him, as you reported. (With ‘Jurist’ on board, there would be no particular need for any others.) …  (Ibid., p. 51.)

I have no explanation for the absence in Vassiliev’s non-sanitized draft manuscript of the report that  “the neighbors’s ‘Jurist’” is missing from the [State Department’s] photograph directory. In Vassiliev’s draft, the wording “Bazarov went on to write,” follows immediately after his archival citation – without any parenthesis that would have indicated a textual omission.

Would Vassiliev have omitted such damning evidence from his draft, which was not supposed to go through any declassification commission? This seems particularly strange in view of Vassiliev’s admission, in his introduction to Spies, that during his first meeting with Allen Weinstein in the fall of 1993, Weinstein gave him Perjury, his 1978 book on the Hiss-Chambers case, and asked him “to be on the lookout for Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers in the files.” Which Vassiliev “promised to do.”

A quick answer may be that Vassiliev had already begun writing his manuscript in London, without access to his “source” notes, [which he later claimed were still in Russia.] But if that was the case, how did he manage to cite his notes on the documents almost verbatim, with practically no omissions?

There is one more strange thing to note: the pagination in Vassiliev’s handwritten Russian Yellow Notebook #2 differs from the pagination in the English translation of this notebook.  Whereas in the Russian handwritten notebook the highlighted text appears on top of notebook page 11, in the English translation file it appears on top of page 12.



[1] Vassiliev’s footnote (12) – illegible

  1. Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, by John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 1.
  2. The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – The Stalin Era, by Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev. New York: Random House, 1999, pp. 5-8, 10.
  3. “Alexander Vassiliev’s Notebooks: Provenance and Documentation of Soviet Intelligence Activities in the United States,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/VassilievNotebooks_Web_intro_Final1.pdf
  4. The manuscript was discovered by Jeff Kisseloff in May 2007 at the Archive of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University.
  5. In fact, Vassiliev’s Russian draft manuscript was translated by Julia Astashkina around Dec. 1996 or Jan. 1997, a fact that is  clear from her fax of Jan. 2, 1997 to Allen Weinstein, in the Weinstein Papers, Hoover Archive.

Alexander Vassiliev’s Notes, Venona and Laurence Duggan

On Reading Venona Decryptions and Alexander Vassiliev’s Notes as Evidence of Espionage.

The Case of Laurence Duggan: The Importance of Context

Since the release in 1994 and 1995 of the Venona documents – the Soviet World War II intelligence communiqués that were intercepted and partially decrypted in the course of the Venona operation – decrypted Venona cables have been cited as damning evidence in support of espionage charges from the early Cold War era. This is particularly true with regard to accusations made in such landmark cases as those of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and Laurence Duggan. Although the decrypted cables offer an important glimpse into the world of Soviet intelligence during that period, they represent only a tiny percentage of the total Soviet intelligence correspondence from those years, which is reported to consist of more than one million cables. Hence there is a good chance that breakthrough information lurks in the un-decrypted 99 or so percent of the overall traffic. Despite this serious limitation, however, historians have rushed to seal many cases of World War II-period espionage, which had remained unresolved for decades. 1

Since the late 1990s, the chief problem with reading the Venona decryptions as evidence of espionage has too often been a lack of context. Contextualization, to cite American historian R. Bruce Craig, is “one of the primary marks distinguishing history written by a trained professional to that written by an amateur.” This lack of context regarding the Venona decryptions has been coupled with “a penchant for only a ‘plain’ reading of documents… that in the case of the Venona decrypts… are indisputably fragmentary and all too often ambiguous.” 2

Among the victims of the “plain” reading of documents have been the partial decryptions of a few Venona cables from 1943 and 1944, which have been cited as damning evidence of World War II espionage by Laurence Duggan, a prominent American diplomat and expert on South American affairs. The Venona translators identified Duggan behind the cover names “Frenk,” “Shervud” and “Knyaz’” (“Prince”), which appeared in nine partially decrypted cables from those years.

In 1999, historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr concluded, based on their “plain” reading of these same Venona cables, that the cables “provide ample evidence that Duggan continued cooperation with Soviet espionage into the 1940s….” 3 In 2009, the authors wrote a new book, making use for the second time of notes on KGB foreign intelligence records taken from 1994 to early 1995 by a former KGB officer and journalist, Alexander Vassiliev. (In 1999, these notes had served as the basis of a book, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – the Stalin Era, which Vassiliev co-authored with Allen Weinstein.) In their 2009 book, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, Haynes and Klehr repeated their 1999 conclusion almost verbatim:

Duggan continued to provide the KGB with American diplomatic information, reporting on Anglo-American plans for the invasion of Italy, consideration of an invasion of Nazi-occupied Norway, U.S. diplomatic approaches to Argentina’s military government, and secret discussions regarding a common Anglo-American policy toward Middle-Eastern oil resources. … 4

To Haynes and Klehr, Vassiliev’s notes are congruent with the partially deciphered Soviet cables translated by the Venona project; moreover, Vassiliev’s notes sometimes provide “undeciphered portions in plain text” from the cables “translated by the Venona project.” Besides, they assert, “cover names that American and British counter-intelligence were unable to identify are linked in Vassiliev’s files to real people, who, upon examination, fit the biographical details found in the KGB cables deciphered by the Venona project.” 5 Yet on this website, I have already documented an obvious disconnect between the appearances of Harry Dexter White – an American Keynesian economist and U.S. Department of Treasury official – in Vassiliev’s notes and in the Venona decryptions, two sources which are commonly cited as evidence of White’s spying during the World War II period.

Click here to have a look at the crosschecking of White’s story as it appeared in Alexander Vassiliev’s notes and in the Venona decryptions

Now, let us see if the few partial Venona decryptions which are commonly cited as evidence of Laurence Duggan’s World War II espionage are indeed congruent with Vassiliev’s notes on Duggan’s KGB file. 6

Laurence Duggan and the TRIDENT Conference

The key Venona evidence of Duggan’s espionage is a partially decrypted cable sent from New York to Moscow on June 30, 1943, which is often cited as “ample evidence” that Duggan continued his active cooperation with Soviet intelligence during World War II. In the decrypted part of this communiqué, “Mer”, the cover name at the time for Iskhak Akhmerov, the Soviet “illegalresident in the United States, gave an account of a recent oral report he had received from “Frank,” who was identified by Venona translators as Duggan:

[Part I] TO VIKTOR [i]. 7

FRENK [ii] reports the following:

1. In the near future the “COUNTRY” [STRANA][iii] and the “ISLAND [OSTROV]”[iv] will land strong forces in ITALY and on her islands with the aim of seizing the whole of ITALY. The forces will be landed simultaneously at various points

[52 groups unrecovered] 8

… In all [B% probability] 9 they [1 group unrecovered] for military operations [in] [a] NORWAY this winter.

[17 groups unrecovered]

[D% but] did not say [D% anything] of the kind. [4 groups unrecovered] beginning in the winter Anglo-American forces will launch a military operation [in] [a] NORWAY. 10

To anyone familiar with the World War II-period correspondence between U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, this partial decryption rings immediate bells. It brings us back to TRIDENT, which was the code name for the conference held by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill with the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. from May 15 to May 25, 1943. The conference’s most historic decision was an agreement to send 29 divisions across the English Channel to invade France, with a target date of May 1, 1944. The Allies also agreed to continue their offensive in the Mediterranean, with the aim of knocking Italy out of the war, and to mount a bombing campaign against the Rumanian oil fields from newly acquired bases in the Mediterranean. The Americans won British support for a stepped-up offensive in the Pacific; the Allies also discussed operations to help China, in order to keep it in the war at all costs. 11

Concerned with keeping Stalin on an equal footing in the alliance, President Roosevelt instructed his chief of staff, General Marshall, to draft a message to the Soviet leader outlining the decisions approved at TRIDENT. The draft was, first, read and approved by Churchill, and then, edited by Roosevelt, who approved it on May 31, 1943 – adding a personal note to Stalin:

June 2, 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and from the President to Premier Stalin.

I am sending you through Ambassador Standley the recently approved decisions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff. These decisions have the joint approval of both Mr. Churchill and myself. In view of their extremely secret nature I am asking Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you     personally.

Roosevelt

FDR 12

Here is what the formal message, known as “the message on recently approved decisions,” said about the Allied plans to invade Italy:

(b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of HUSKY, (viz. the assault on Sicily,) for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control of the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be referred to.

As to the “consideration of invasion of Nazi-occupied Norway,” to cite from Haynes and Klehr, the June 2 message said:

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken … while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched….” 13

The message was sent to Moscow on June 2 and received by Stalin only two days later, on June 4. Here is how Ambassador Standley reported on its arrival to President Roosevelt:

Message delivered Moscow time 23 hours Friday June 4. Molotov and interpreter Pavlov present. Message translated in my presence. I advised Stalin of our plans to preserve secrecy and that he could use same channel for his reply. Stalin listened attentively to the message showing no evidence of surprise. He exhibited no reactions other than stating that he understood the general purport of the message and after careful study for two or three days would make a reply. 14

Stalin was, in fact, deeply disappointed with the delay in launching the Allied invasion of France, which he saw as a contradiction to the decisions “regarding the terms of the opening of the second front in Western Europe” made by Roosevelt and Churchill at the beginning of 1943. Neither Italy nor Norway was on top of Stalin’s agenda; his major concern was the postponement of opening the second front in Europe, as he wrote to Roosevelt in disappointment on June 11:

This decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which has already been fighting for two years, with utmost strain of its strength, against the main forces of Germany and her satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, fighting not only for its country, but also for its allies, to its own strength, almost in single combat with yet very strong and dangerous enemy. 15

To ease Stalin’s frustration, Winston Churchill wrote to him on June 19 about the Allied plans in Italy:

2. The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not by losing them. … It is my earnest and sober hope that we can knock Italy out of the war this year, … The great attack that is now not far off will absorb the capacities of every port under our control in the Mediterranean from Gibralter to Port Said inclusive. … 16

Getting back to Laurence Duggan – in view of the correspondence between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill in the period between June 2 and June 19, 1943, the information in the Venona cable from June 30, 1943, when taken out of the vacuum of its “plain” reading and placed in its real-life historical context, looks like a complete déjà vu. By no stretch of the imagination would Duggan’s passing some shred of information – which had been transmitted to Stalin through official channels almost a month earlier – qualify as evidence of espionage. According to contemporary FBI discussions (held between 1947 and 1950) of the evidence criteria [used] in prosecuting on charges of espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage, sustaining such prosecution required the presence of “the definite identification of a secret, confidential or restricted item which had been conveyed to an agent of a foreign government with knowledge or intent to harm the United States or to aid a foreign government.” 17 The information in the Venona cable from June 30, 1943 does not meet these criteria.

In fact, there is a fragmentary Venona decryption of an earlier spillover from the discussions at TRIDENT that could be traced back to Laurence Duggan – but has not commonly been attributed to him. On May 29, 1943, Soviet intelligence’s New York station sent Moscow a communiqué signed by “Mer”/ Akhmerov, reporting on conversations between “Kapitan” (a cover name for Roosevelt) and “Kaban” (a cover name for Churchill). The decrypted part of the message said the following:

“19”[ii] reports that “KAPITAN” [iii] and “KABAN” [iv], during conversations in the “COUNTRY” [STRANA][v], invited “19” to join them and ZAMESTITEL’[v] openly told “KABAN”

[10 groups unrecovered]

second front against GERMANY this year. KABAN considers that, if a second front should prove to be unsuccessful, then this [3 groups unrecovered] harm to Russian interests and [6 groups unrecovered]. He considers it more advantageous and effective to weaken GERMANY by bombing and to use this time for “[4 groups unrecovered] political crisis so that there may be no doubt that a second front next year will prove successful.”

ZAMESTITEL’ and

[14 groups unrecovered]

19 thinks that “KAPITAN” is not informing ZAMESTITEL’ of important military decisions and that therefore ZAMESTITEL’ may not have exact knowledge of [1 group unrecovered] with the opening of a second front against GERMANY and its postponement from this year to next year. 19 says that ZAMESTITEL’ personally is an ardent supporter of a second front at this time and considers postponement

– 2 –

[15 groups unrecovered]

can shed blood

[13 groups unrecovered]

recently shipping between the USA and

[40 groups unrecovered]

The “COUNTRY” hardly [9 groups unrecovered] ‘insufficient reason for delaying a second front.’

No. 443 MER[vii] 18

As noted above, “Kapitan” (“Captain”) was the cover name used for President Roosevelt, and “Kaban” (“Boar”), the cover name for Prime Minister Churchill. At the time of the cable’s release in 1996, “19” (in fact, “19th” – “Devyatnastsatyi”) had not been identified. Venona translators had identified “Zamestitel’” (“Deputy”) as “possibly Henry Agard Wallace,”, who as U.S. Vice President was Roosevelt’s “Deputy.” The translators were not sure of this conclusion, since elsewhere in Venona communications Wallace appeared as “Lotsman” (“Pilot”). Their other guess was Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s close advisor and special assistant. 19

Discussing the Venona decryption of the May 29, 1943 cable in their 1999 Venona book, Haynes and Klehr did not suspect that Duggan might be behind the cover name “19.” Moreover, unaware at that time that the OGPUNKVD foreign intelligence frequently used numerical cover names before World War II, they erroneously assumed that the cable reported “about a GRU contact.” To Haynes and Klehr, the Venona decryption provided “too little material for a firm judgment on the identity of Source No. 19”:

It appears that this source was at the Trident conference or one of its ancillary events and was very highly placed, since he was asked to join a private conversation with Roosevelt and Churchill. Beyond that, however, it is difficult to get much of a clue about No. 19’s identity. It is not even clear that Source No. 19 was American: possibly he was part of the British delegation that accompanied Churchill, … 20

Haynes and Klehr had not checked the TRIDENT attendance records, deferring to a “close reading” by the late Edward Mark, a Department of the Air Force historian, who argued that “Zamestitel’” (“Deputy”) was Henry Wallace and Source No 19 “was most likely” Harry Hopkins.

Click here to read about the origins of Dr. Mark’s theory – and then come back to read about yet another disconnect between Duggan’s appearance in Venona cables and in Vassiliev’s notes

“Impressed by Mark’s analysis,” Haynes and Klehr still viewed the evidence in the partial decryption as “too slim” to enable them “to reach a judgment about Source No 19’s identity.” 21 Amazingly, in an index of cover names and real names compiled by Haynes and last updated in April 2009, “19” appears as “Harry Hopkins at Trident conference.” 22

To resolve the confusion over identifying “19” from the May 29, 1943 Venona decryption, it is necessary to take a close look at the TRIDENT attendance records – and also to resolve the confusion over identifying the cryptonym “Zamestitel’” (“Deputy”). In Vassiliev’s notes, “Zamestitel’” looks like a generic cover name used to identify more than one official position:

1) “Zamestitel’ Kapitana” (“Captain’s deputy”) – a cover name used for President Roosevelt’s (Kapitan/Captain’s) Vice President (in Vassiliev’s notes, this was Henry Wallace in 1944);

2) “Zamestitel’ mekhanika” (“Mechanic’s” deputy) – a designation for Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943 and, literally, the “deputy” to Cordell Hull,  the Secretary of State (“Mechanic”); 23

3) “Zamestitel’” also appears as Laurence Steinhardt, the American Ambassador in Moscow from 1939 to 1941. 24 In the context of the May 29, 1943 Venona decryption, Sumner Welles looks like a probable candidate for “Zamestitel’”, in view of his close relationship with President Roosevelt and his position at that time as the central figure at the Department of State.

Provided that Sumner Welles was, in fact, present at any of the TRIDENT meetings, this would increase the probability that his protégé Duggan was the elusive “19” mentioned in the Venona decryption of the Soviet communiqué from May 29, 1943. Until I have a chance to review the TRIDENT records in person, I will have to abstain from any definitive identification.

Even if we put aside the confusion over identification of the cover names, the message in the May 29, 1943 cable would not have been news in Moscow, given the time needed for its decryption, translation and passage along the chain of command. A cable sent from New York to Moscow on May 29, 1943 would have had no chance of landing on Stalin’s desk before Roosevelt’s more detailed message of June 2, which was discussed above. Judging by the dates on intelligence messages from the 1930s, the translations of which appear in the Joseph Stalin Papers, the interval between the receipt of a communiqué by the Moscow foreign intelligence Center and its delivery to Stalin was usually between one-plus week and one month. 25 This situation had not changed by the 1940s.

Our confusion does not end here. On closer crosschecking of Venona decryptions and Vassiliev’s notes on Laurence Duggan’s file, it becomes even deeper – until we end up with an obvious disconnect between the two major bodies of evidence of Soviet World War II espionage.


The Cover-Name Disconnect

Comparing Vassiliev’s notes on Laurence Duggan’s file with Venona decryptions that mention the cover names usually associated with Duggan, one sees very little correlation between these two sources on the history of Soviet espionage in the United States.

In Vassiliev’s notes on Duggan’s file, “19th” appears continuously as Laurence Duggan’s cover name (operational pseudonym) from 1936 to early 1943, as well as in the notes on a few communications from 1944. The use of “19th” as Duggan’s operational pseudonym was confirmed to me in person in 2002, by the retired KGB General Vitaly Pavlov. 26 Yet among all Venona decryptions that have been released, “19th” appears only once – in the above-mentioned communiqué from May 29, 1943 – and was not identified by Venona translators as Duggan.

So what do we see in later Venona cables? In decrypts from June 30, 1943, and July 22 and August 4, 1944, Duggan was identified behind the cover name “Frenk” [“Frank”], and in a decryption from May 24, 1944 – behind “Fr.,” which looks like an abbreviation of that cover name. In Vassiliev’s notes, however, “Frenk” appears interchangeably with “19th”. Vassiliev explains this in a notation under his notes on Akhmerov’s communiqué to the Center from November 17, 1942: “In his letters, Mer calls 19 Frank.”27 At the same time, in Vassiliev’s notes on the summaries of Akhmerov’s cipher cables written by Moscow operatives, Duggan continues to appear as “19” well into 1944 – suggesting still another disconnect between Vassiliev’s notes and Venona decryptions. 28

The plot gets thicker with further comparisons between Venona decryptions and Vassiliev’s notes. According to a Venona-decrypted cable from September 2, 1944, in which Moscow advised its U.S. outpost of new cover names, Moscow proposed the cover name “Knyaz’” [“Prince”] as a replacement for the cover name “Shervud” [“Sherwood”] – which had been introduced by the New York station but was considered “disadvantageous” in Moscow. 29 But in Vassiliev’s notes, “Prince’” appears almost two months earlier than the date when, according to the Venona decryption cited above, that cover name was sent by Moscow Center to its New York outpost. On July 7, 1944, Akhmerov informed Moscow about Laurence Duggan’s resignation from the Department of State:

“Prince’s resignation came as a surprise to me. I did not expect him to quit his job in that division altogether. He spoke to me quite often about his difficulties and his situation there. His situation became especially shaky after his chief superior’s deputy was forced to leave the department. As you know, many years ago this deputy brought Prince into the department, and he was thought of as his man (protégé). Recently, Prince informed me that the chief superior hates the deputy who resigned because of his polit. activities in the press and his speeches, which criticize the director’s division as well as his political views.” 30

To add to the confusion, almost two weeks later, on July 20, the New York “legal” resident “May” used the cover name “19” in his report on Duggan’s resignation. Yet according to the Venona translations, Duggan’s cover name at the time was “Frank”:

20.7.44 May reported from NY that 19 has tendered his resignation from the SD, supposedly for personal reasons. Ovakimyan’s resolution: “It is strange that we are learning about this after the fact.” 21.7.44 31

In Vassiliev’s notes, Duggan appeared as “19” for the last time in a brief note from page 232 of Duggan’s file:

p.232 19 has become assistant diplomatic adviser to the UNRRA. 32

This is the last note Vassiliev took on the World War II part of Duggan’s file. It refers to Duggan’s appointment as deputy to the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). But in Vassiliev’s last note regarding Akhmerov’s reports about his meetings with Duggan, dated February 4, 1943, Duggan appears as “Frank,” not as “19.” According to Vassiliev’s notes, this report appears on pages 202-205 of Duggan’s personal file. Vassiliev made his next note on an undated document referring to pages 219-222, which he entitled, “A Reference on the 19.” He made his next note on file page 228, which was a July 20, 1944 communiqué from “May,” the station chief in New York, about the resignation of “19.” Probably, this disconnect can be explained by the fact that the original cover name, “19,” continued to be in use simultaneously with the new name, “Frank”— except for the fact that this looks like a breach of tradecraft. It is likely that Akhmerov used the cover name “Frank” exclusively in his independent communications line with Moscow Center. 33 But the sketchiness of Vassiliev’s notes on Duggan’s file, along with the miniscule share that Venona decryptions represent in the vast sea of Soviet intelligence traffic from the World War II period, makes it impossible to resolve this cover-name confusion.


The Timing Disconnect

The sketchiness of Vassiliev’s notes on Laurence Duggan’s file also makes it difficult for us to place the Venona decryptions usually associated with Duggan’s espionage into a real-life context – as part of Duggan’s contacts with Soviet intelligence. There is a clear disconnect between the timeline suggested in Vassiliev’s notes and in the Venona decryptions.

Click here to have a look at a chart comparing Venona decryptions with Vassiliev’s notes on Duggan’s file – and then come back to this page for further discussion of the two sources

Judging by the partial decryptions of Venona cables sent between late May and late June, 1943, Duggan was in active communication at that time with Iskhak Akhmerov, the Soviet “illegal” resident in the United States – whom he knew only as Alexander Hansen. But Vassiliev did not make a single note on any meeting that could have provided an occasion for Duggan to deliver information, although such meetings were reported in Venona decryptions of Soviet communiqués from May 29, June 18 and June 30, 1943. 34 Yet Vassiliev’s notes on Duggan’s file do contain a single, definitive report about a contact between Akhmerov and Duggan, dated February 25, 1942:

p.185 Report on a cipher telegram dated 25.2.42 from NY

“Mer” contacted 19, who said he was willing to help us, but that there were no opportunities at present. A month ago Berle, after drinking a good deal of wine, reminded 19 about his affinity for left elements. 19 says that as long as Berle is with the firm, 19 will not be able to get ahead. At present, he is working on Mexico and oil-related questions, and he promised to tell us everything he knows. We agreed to meet once a month. 35

In Vassiliev’s notes, there is no hint of any regular meetings between Duggan and the Soviet “illegal.” Moreover, the note reporting on file page 185, cited above, is almost directly followed by this note on file page 192:

p.192 It was difficult for “Mer” to meet with 19: the latter didn’t come to meetings and was very busy, and Mer was unable to stay in Washington for long. 36

Vassiliev’s next note, reporting on the same page of the file, contains no information about subsequent meetings between Akhmerov and Duggan:

p.192 Mer – to C 9.10.42

He is an honest and genuinely progressive-minded person…He is a true American with all the patriotic qualities, and has spent a number of years doing significant, high-level work towards the realization of the USA’s imperialist ambitions. [Mer wanted to introduce 19 to “Nelly” in case Mer was drafted into the army.] 37

More than a month later, Akhmerov was still explaining to Moscow Center Duggan’s reluctance to cooperate:

p.193 Mer – to C 17.11.42

He is a genuinely progressive American. He sympathizes with us and understands our role in this war, but at the same time, he is an American patriot through and through. His intellect is shaped by his continued, concrete work putting into practice America’s influence on its neighbors. He is not a fellowcountryman or a paid probationer, and he is absolutely determined not to risk his position. Having once been burned, he is prone to significantly exaggerating any danger. He used to bring me bundles of the most interesting materials from his office; now he does everything he can to avoid even citing his sources when he reports something to me. 38

Almost three months later, according to Vassiliev’s notes, Akhmerov was still trying to persuade the Moscow operatives that it would be futile to solicit Duggan’s cooperation by putting pressure on him:

p.201 Mer – to Center 2.2.43 cipher telegram

“I do not think it would be worthwhile to … put pressure on him, [Frank] as you suggest in your letter of November 26. …. I think that speaking with F. in the manner you suggest in your letter … he will try to break with us under various pretexts.”

p.202 Letter from Mer dated 4.2.1943 [February 4, 1943]

“As you know, he is not a fellowcountryman or a paid probationer. He is a very decent and progressive American. He has always helped us, and acknowledges that we are the vanguard of progressive mankind. He has never taken a single cent from us. Our personal friendship has also played a major part in our liaison. Having been seriously frightened because of his connection with us, he is now inclined to exaggerate this danger even more. I believe he was burned to some degree in the past, and that he kept his job due to the absence of concrete material evidence….

p.203 Shared ideology and personal friendship are the mainsprings of our connection with Frank. Because of his personal qualities — he is an exceptionally honorable man— he could never imagine that we might put pressure on him, exploiting the work he did for us in the past. If this thought had ever seriously occurred to him, he would have long since rid himself of us. Any hint on our part (regardless of how delicately or diplomatically we put it) about the fact that he is firmly connected with us

p.204 and that, having agreed to work for us, he took upon himself a certain obligation, would make it clear to him which way the wind was blowing. … Suppose we did give him to understand more clearly his firm bond with us, his responsibility, and so forth. Would we be able to frighten him and compel him to work? Of course not. He knows we would never deliberately expose him. …

p.205 Pressure of this sort or any other can be applied if it guarantees some measure of success. In Frank’s case, this method will lead to nothing. So far, I have only one method of working with him: serious politico-educational influence; instilling in him the thought that, in helping us, he is helping the very best of humanity; expressing our sincere gratitude; persistently appealing to his conscience to help us more actively; and developing our personal friendship. I hope we can win him over with this method. …” 39

Vassiliev’s sketchy notes do not tell us whether Akhmerov’s methods produced results, since they do not record any follow-up interaction between Akhmerov and Duggan. In Vassiliev’s notes, Akhmerov’s long letter from February 4, 1943, quoted above, is followed by an undated “Report on 19,” apparently compiled by the Moscow operatives. There are, supposedly, 14 file pages between that report and Akhmerov’s February 4 note, pages on which Vassiliev took no notes. Were these pages irrelevant, repetitive, just plain dull – or might they contain some breakthrough information? Vassiliev’s notes give no clues. We are even at sea regarding the dating of this report. The only certain thing is that Moscow was suspicious of Duggan at that time – and was also dissatisfied with the infrequency of his meetings with Akhmerov, its “illegal”:

p.219 Report on 19

Negative factors:

1) “Because he occupies a high government post, has a family, and is constantly in a non-left and reactionary environment, the source is losing his party feeling, on the basis of which we had begun working with him.”

p.220 He succumbs to the influence of Trotskyites and anti-Soviets.

2) Vacillation on issues of USSR’s domestic and foreign policies, Trotskyite tendencies.

3) He is known for his liberalism and for his connection to the embassy. [e.g. Soviet embassy. – S. Ch.]

Known to:

1. “Raymond”; 2. Krivitsky/possibly; 3. “Nikolay”– enemy of the people; 4. it is possible that the traitor “Nord” betrayed 19 to foreign intelligence.

4) He tried to break off his connection 6 times.

p.222 It is essential that “Mer” get 19 to meet with him more frequently and that he devote more energy to 19’s ideological education. 40

This report is directly followed in Vassiliev’s notes by a July 20, 1944 report on Duggan’s resignation from the Department of State:

p.228 20.7.44 [July 20, 1944] May reported from NY that 19 has tendered his resignation from the SD, supposedly for personal reasons. Ovakimian’s resolution: “It is strange that we are learning about this after the fact.” 21.7.44 41

There is an obvious disconnect between the ex post facto report by “May” (the cover name for the current “legal” operative in New York, Stepan Apresyan) – and the partially decrypted report on Duggan’s forthcoming resignation in a Venona cable dated two days later, July 22, 1944:

FRANK [FRENK][ix] will resign from the BANK [x] allegedly “for personal reasons”. Details and prospects for the future are being looked into.

Notes:

[ix] FRENK: possibly Laurence DUGGAN. … 42

The dating disconnect is even more surprising in view of Vassiliev’s notes on reports by Akhmerov (then known as “Albert”) about the same event, dated July 10, 1944. Let us look again at that July 10 report, which although written 12 days before “May”’s July 20 report is itself ex post facto:

Report by “Albert” dated 10.7.44

“Prince’s resignation came as a surprise to me. I did not expect him to quit his job in that division altogether. He spoke to me quite often about his difficulties and his situation there. His situation became especially shaky after his chief superior’s deputy was forced to leave the department. As you know, many years ago this deputy brought Prince into the department, and he was thought of as his man (protégé). Recently, Prince informed me that the chief superior hates the deputy who resigned because of his polit. activities in the press and his speeches, which criticize the director’s division as well as his political views.” 43

Although adding to the dating confusion, this is, in fact, the only report that suggests continuation of Akhmerov’s meetings with Duggan after those he wrote about in early 1942. The “chief deputy” mentioned in the report is, apparently, Duggan’s patron Sumner Welles, who was forced to resign from the Department of State in August, 1943. The “chief superior” was Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State.

Within weeks, Duggan moved to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). As we have seen before, Vassiliev made only a brief notation on his transfer:

p.232 19 has become assistant diplomatic adviser to the UNRRA. 44

Among Venona’s partial decryptions, we find a more detailed, although, again, fragmentary, account in a communiqué sent from New York to Moscow on August 4, 1944:

1. FRENK’s MOVE FROM THE BANK (STATE DEPT) TO THE SHELTER (UNRRA), MER

FRENK[ii] has been appointed [2 groups unrecovered] Assistant Diplomatic Adviser of the SHELTER[PRIYuT][iii]. The former ambassador [iv] of the COUNTRY[STRANA][v] to RIO[vi] now occupies his previous post.

MER [vii] [4 groups unrecovered] [B% residency did not know] about this change. According to MER, FRENK, even before this, was announcing that his position in the BANK [viii] was precarious, but, since MER confronted him with the question of keeping [2 groups unrecovered] about leaving the BANK, F. [ii] in our hearing never [9 groups unrecovered] F.’s potential.

No 619 MAJ [xi]

Footnotes:

[ii] FRENK, F.: i.e. Laurence Duggan, Director of Office of American Republic Affairs, U.S. State Department, to 19 July 1944, Assistant Diplomatic Adviser to UNRRA July 1944-1946. 45

Both Vassiliev’s notes and Venona decryptions create the impression that, after Duggan’s transfer to UNRRA, Soviet contact with him was broken. This impression is supported by a mid-November report to Moscow on Akhmerov’s failed attempt to meet with Duggan in mid-October, which was not followed up either in Venona cables or in Vassiliev’s notes. 46


A Report that Escaped the Venona Code-Breakers

At the end of the day, both the Venona decryptions and Vassiliev’s notes look like unreliable evidence of Laurence Duggan’s espionage during World War II. The information is too fragmentary and confusing to arrive at any definitive conclusion. It seems likely that, from 1942 to mid-1944, Duggan continued to hold occasional meetings with Akhmerov, during which he occasionally shared some oral information and his own estimate of the political situation. But this is all one can surmise after analyzing these two sources.

A few years ago, researching in the Russian Foreign Ministry’s World War II-period files, I came across a document which can be sourced to Duggan with some degree of certainty. It was a once Top Secret foreign intelligence report on the resignation of Sumner Welles as Under Secretary of State. Addressed to Vladimir Dekanozov, the Deputy Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and signed by Pavel Fitin, the head of the 1st [foreign intelligence] Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, the report transmitted information the Directorate received on August 28, 1943 from its “very well informed source”:

In the opinion of our very well informed source, the resignation of WELLES is an unfavorable development [‘factor’] for Soviet-American relations. Although WELLES has never been a friend of the USSR, he, however, had realistically estimated its role and tried to improve relations between the USA and the USSR and was an advocate of concluding an agreement on political issues without waiting for the end of the war.

HULL represents the old reactionary trend. This is a cunning politician who enjoys decisive influence among Southern Democrats. An opponent of concluding an agreement prior to final formulation [‘oformlenije’] of American public opinion. Has always been hostile to the Soviet Union. A supporter of restoring pre-war status quo in the Baltics and in the Balkans.

In view of the coming presidential elections, ROOSEVELT could not ignore HULL’s role and preferred to keep [preserve] him despite his [Roosevelt’s] friendship with WELLES.

The source supposes that in case WELLES is sent to Moscow as Roosevelt’s representative for negotiations, the State Department would surely sabotage his activity. 47

This communiqué obviously belongs to the 99% of Soviet World War II-period intelligence communications traffic that was not decrypted by Venona code-breakers. It was received in Moscow on the day after Sumner Welles announced his resignation from the post of Under Secretary of State to foreign ambassadors in Washington, D.C. (Twelve days earlier, on August 16, he had submitted his resignation in a letter to President Roosevelt.) 48 In hindsight, the estimate provided by the “very well informed source” was extremely accurate; the details indicate that the source was a confidant of Welles himself.

In this respect, the last passage in Fitin’s report is most revealing:

The source supposes that in case WELLES is sent to Moscow as Roosevelt’s representative for negotiations, the State Department would surely sabotage his activity.

Indeed, after Welles submitted his resignation to President Roosevelt, the latter offered to appoint him to head the U.S. delegation at an allied military and political conference, which at that time was in the initial planning stage. Six days after the NKGB intelligence directorate received the information on Welles’s resignation, Roosevelt wrote in his personal message to Stalin:

4 September 1943.

Personal from the President to Marshall Stalin;

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting on the State Department level.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or somewhere in England…

5. If Mr. Molotov comes and Mr. Eden I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles… 49

When Roosevelt wrote this message to Stalin, Welles’s resignation had not yet been officially announced; a formal announcement by the White House was not made until September 30. Stalin received Roosevelt’s message on September 6 and wrote his reply on September 8. Conspicuously, he wrote nothing in response to Roosevelt’s mention of sending Welles to the proposed meeting, limiting himself to a single succinct paragraph:

September 8, 1943

Stalin to Roosevelt

Your message in which you touched upon several important questions I received on September 6.

First. …

Second. I consider that the beginning of October as the Prime Minister suggested would be a convenient time for the meeting of the three our representatives, and I propose as the place of the meeting – Moscow. By that time the three Governments could have reached an agreement regarding the questions which have to be discussed as well as the proposals on those questions, without which (agreement) the meeting will not give the necessary results in which our Governments are interested. 50

Was Stalin informed by NKGB foreign intelligence about Welles’s forthcoming resignation and his prospects? Probably so (although to date I have not discovered any documentary confirmation of this in Stalin’s publicly accessible records), hence the absence of any response to Roosevelt’s discussion of Welles. Was there some particular reason for NKGB foreign intelligence to have received this information? In that case, the information from a “well informed source” – probably Laurence Duggan, given his close relationship with Welles – helped to smooth the edges and save Roosevelt from embarrassment. Stalin simply dropped the uncomfortable subject – giving Roosevelt a free hand to move ahead on the diplomatic front.

General Fitin’s report provides a glimpse into the vast sea of the Soviet World War II intelligence cable traffic that was not broken in the course of the Venona operation. Such a glimpse is rare, but not unique, since the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was routinely receiving reports on information pertaining to the conduct of foreign policy from both branches of Soviet intelligence. The name of Molotov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, was the second after Stalin’s on the distribution lists of intelligence reports. Molotov’s name was sometimes followed by the names of his deputies. Information from intelligence sources was reported to the members of the Politburo, with some part of it subsequently communicated to the departments of the VCP (b).

Elsewhere on this website, we will discuss the appearance of other communiqués from the non-decrypted pool of Venona cable traffic that have been discovered in publicly accessible Russian records. Suffice it to say here, in conclusion, that the rare appearance of a cable from that huge pool of undecrypted Soviet cable traffic – a cable which also is not mentioned anywhere in Vassiliev’s notes on contemporary foreign intelligence files – suggests that even reading these two available sources on the history of Soviet espionage in America in tandem may sometimes prove unreliable.

  1. Most prominently, in Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999; and in The Venona Secrets, Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors, by Herbert Rommerstein and Eric Breindel, Regnery Publishing, 2001. The only “Venona” book published in Russian, Lev Lainer, “Venona”: samaja sekretnaja operatsija amerikanskikh spetssluzhb, Moskva: Olma Press, 2003 (Lev Lyner, “Venona”: The Most Secret Operation of the American Secret Services, Moscow: Olma Press, 2003) is a compilation drawn from American publications.
  2. Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case, by R. Bruce Craig, University Press of Kansas, 2004, p. 264.
  3. Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, Op. cit., p. 203.
  4. Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, by John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 242.
  5. “Alexander Vassiliev’s Notebooks: Provenance and Documentation of Soviet Intelligence Activities in the United States,” by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ topics/docs/VassilievNotebooks_Web%20intro_Final.pdf
  6. Alexander Vassiliev’s notes on “Knyaz’” (Laurence Duggan) file, Archival No. 36857, Yellow Notebook #2, pp. 1-37. Vassiliev’s notes cited in the translation by Philip Redko, reviewed and edited by Alexander Vassiliev and John Earl Haynes (2007).
  7. Here and after, the Roman numerals and occasional letters in brackets indicate the translators’ footnotes in Venona documents.
  8. Here and after, this means the number of cryptonyms which have not been decrypted.
  9. In Venona decryptions, A%, B%, C%, D% indicate the level of presumed certainty in the decryption. In this case, a B (second from top) level of certainty refers to the word probability.”
  10. Venona, KGB New York to Moscow #1025, June 30, 1943.
  11. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/291225/international-relations/32913/Strategy-and-diplomacy-of-the-Grand-Alliance#ref=ref304405
  12. My Dear Mr. Stalin. The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin. Edited, with Commentary, by Susan Butler, Yale University Press, 2005, pp. 135-136.
  13. Ibid., p. 137. The Russian translation published in: Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SShA i premier-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg. Tom vtoroi, Perepiska s F. Ruzvel’tom i G. Trumenom (avgust 1941 g. – dekabr’ 1945 g.), Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1958, s. 67. (The Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and Prime-Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Volume 2, The Correspondence with F. Roosevelt and H. Truman (August 1941 – December 1945), Moscow: Politizdat, 1958, p. 67.
  14. Ibid., p. 136.
  15. Stalin to Roosevelt, June 11, 1943, My Dear Mr. Stalin, Op. cit., pp. 138-139. The Russian original in Op. cit., p. 69-70.
  16. Ibid., p. 142; Churchill’s message is missing from the Russian 1958 edition, which contains, instead, Stalin’s response to that message, dated June 24, 1943, Op. cit., pp. 73-75.
  17. E.P. Morgan to H.H. Clegg, January 14, 1947, The FBI FOIA Rosenberg File, Subject Silvermaster, File No 65-56402, Vol. 093, Serials 2000-2081, PDF pp. 166-170; E.A. Tamm to the FBI Director J.E. Hoover, January 23, 1947, Ibid., PDF pp. 20-21; E.A. Tamm to the Director, February 21, 1947, Ibid., Vol. 098, Serials 2183 to 2210, PDF p. 38; A.S. Brent to C.E. Hennrich, Oct. 30, 1950, Ibid., Vol. 150, Serials 3835-3896, PDF p. 51.
  18. Venona, New York to Moscow No 812, May 29, 1943.
  19. Ibidem.
  20. Venona, Op. cit., pp. 205-206.
  21. Ibid., pp. 422-423 (ft. 42), Cit., Edward Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the Trident Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?” Intelligence and National Security, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 1-31.
  22. “Cover Name, Cryptonym, Pseudonym, and Real Name Index. A Research Historian’s Working Reference,” Compiled by John Earl Haynes, updated April 2009, retrieved on December 1, 2009, http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page66.html. The identification of “19” as Harry Hopkins is sourced to Dr. Edward Mark, with an additional reference that “Mark also discussed Lord Beaverbrook as a weak candidate for 19.”
  23. Jung” to Moscow Center, October 5, 1939, Yellow Notebook No 2, pp. 25-26. Mechanic’s deputy was described as the patron of “19th”: “Mechanic’s deputy, who is currently presiding over a conference in the South, … had previously taken Nineteenth under his wing and thought of him as his man.”
  24. Yellow Notebook No 2, p. 25.
  25. Lichnyi arkhiv I.V. Stalina, Fond 558, opis’ 11, dela 185-188 (J.V. Stalin Private Papers, Fund 558, description 11, files 185-188), RGASPI
  26. In one of his interviews with me in 2002, General Pavlov volunteered his identification of Laurence Duggan as agent “19th”: “I’d like to add that at that time Akhmerov was in contact with our agent ‘19’ – Lawrence Duggan — who used to work at the Department of State. My memory about Duggan is very clear…. that … his cover name was ‘19th’. In my memoir, I called him ‘29th” as a cover up.” Svetlana Chervonnaya’s interview with Lt.-General Vitaly Pavlov, May 16, 2002, Moscow. Pavlov referred to his book, Operatsija “Sneg”: Polveka vo vneshnei razvedke KGB, “Geja” – Moskva, 1996 (Operation “Snow”: Half a Century with KGB Foreign Intelligence, by Vitaly Pavlov, Moscow: “Geya,” 1996).
  27. Alexander Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #2, p. 29.
  28. For instance, in the “Report on [a] cipher telegram from New York,” dated February 25, 1942, Ibid., p. 28.
  29. Venona, New York to Moscow #1251, September 2, 1944.
  30. Report by “Albert” dated July 7, 1944, Alexander Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #2, p. 34. By “Prince”’s “chief superior,” Akhmerov meant Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and by his “deputy” – Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State.
  31. “May” to Moscow Center, July 21, 1944, Ibidem.
  32. Ibid., p. 34.
  33. According to existing accounts, Akhmerov had an independent communication line with Moscow Center via the New York “legal” station based at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. For security, he wrote his dispatches in English and they were then delivered by couriers to the New York “legal” station, where they were translated, encoded, enciphered and then cabled to Moscow – or sent by the pouch (the longer reports).
  34. Venona New York to Moscow, Nos. 812, 916, 1025, Op. cit.
  35. Alexander Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook No 2, p. 28.
  36. Ibidem.
  37. Ibid., p. 29.
  38. Ibidem.
  39. Ibid., p. 31-32.
  40. Ibid., p. 33.
  41. Ibidem.
  42. Venona, New York to Moscow #1015, July 22, 1944.
  43. Report by “Albert” from July 7, 1944, Op. cit.
  44. Ibid., p. 34.
  45. Venona, New York to Moscow #1114, August 4, 1944.
  46. Venona, New York to Moscow #1613, November 18, 1944. In Vassiliev’s notes, a note on Duggan’s transfer to UNRRA is directly followed by a note on an early 1948 report on the appearance of an article by Duggan in the December issue of America magazine. Yellow Notebook #2, p. 34.
  47. Fitin to Dekanozov, September 24, 1943, Fund 0129 [Assessments (Referentura) on the USA, description 27, P. No 149, folder 9, p. 37, AVP RF.
  48. Sumner Welles’s resignation letter to the President, August 16, 1943, retrieved from http://www.gutenberg-e.org/osc01/images/osc08ca.html
  49. Roosevelt to Stalin, September 4, 1943, My Dear Mr. Stalin, Op. Cit., p. 160. The italics indicate President Roosevelt’s editing. Russian edition (1958), Op. cit., p. 87.
  50. Stalin to Roosevelt, September 8, 1943, Ibid., pp. 161-162; Russian edition (1958), Op. cit., p. 89.

Hopkins, Harry Lloyd (1890-1946)

Harry Lloyd Hopkins

A federal administrator and presidential advisor who is known in 20th-century American history for his unwavering loyalty to President Franklin Roosevelt, his hard-driving enthusiasm for the New Deal and his “piercing understanding” of World War II problems.

Harry Lloyd Hopkins was born on August 17, 1890 in Sioux City, Iowa, the fourth child of David Aldona Hopkins and Anna Pickett. His father ran a harness shop and eventually made his long-time passion, bowling, into his career. His mother was deeply religious and an active Methodist. Thhe family soon moved to Nebraska, then to Chicago, and finally to Grinnell, Iowa, where Hopkins graduated from high school and studied American politics and the British parliamentary system at Grinnell College. He graduated cum laude in 1912.

Hopkins’s first job after graduation was with Christodora House, a settlement house on New York City’s Lower East Side which was one of the working-class relief efforts in the Progressive Era. His next move was to the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, where he served as a “friendly visitor” and superintendent of the employment bureau. In 1915, he was appointed executive secretary of the New York Bureau of Child Welfare, which administered pensions to mothers with dependent children. Hopkins’s early experience played a significant role in shaping his ideal of government responsibility for impoverished Americans. 1

After America entered World War I, Hopkins wanted to enlist in the Army but was rejected for health reasons. Instead, he moved to New Orleans to serve as Director of Civilian Relief for the Gulf Division of the American Red Cross – and eventually moved up to head the Red Cross divisions in the American Southwest. In 1922, Hopkins returned to New York City to become Chief of the Division on Health Conditions for the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor; in 1924, he became the General Director of the New York Tuberculosis Association. He also took part in drafting a charter for the American Association of Social Workers and became its president in 1923.

In 1928, Hopkins supported Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt for governor of New York. In 1931, Roosevelt chose Hopkins to run America’s first state relief organization – the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA). Modeled on the Red Cross relief program, it worked to combat the effects of the Great Depression in New York State and helped hundreds of thousands of people to survive through the most difficult times. Hopkins’s work in creating and running TERA paved the way for his leading role in President Roosevelt’s New Deal administration.

In 1932, Hopkins supported Roosevelt’s campaign for the presidency and his promise of a ‘New Deal’ for Americans. In early 1933, Hopkins moved to Washington, D.C. to become director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which would provide immediate relief for the country’s millions of homeless and hungry residents. While remaining head of FERA, Hopkins was simultaneously appointed Civil Works Administrator (CWA) in November 1933, to put about four million people to work during the harsh winter of 1933-1934. In 1935, he was appointed head of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), to put another three-and-a-half million people to work. Hopkins also served in other New Deal emergency relief agencies – such as the President’s Draught Committee, the Industrial Emergency Committee and the National Emergency Council – and on the boards of many other New Deal agencies like the National Resources Planning Board. Roosevelt’s speechwriter, Robert E. Sherwood, wrote later that “Hopkins came to be regarded as the Chief Apostle of the New Deal and the most cordially hated by its enemies.” 2

In 1937, Hopkins was operated on for stomach cancer – a disease he would continue to battle for years to come. In December 1938, he became Roosevelt’s Secretary of Commerce, but resigned in November 1940 due to health problems. From 1940 to 1945, Hopkins continued as Roosevelt’s confidant, adviser and personal representative. Reflecting on Hopkins’s role, Roosevelt said in 1941: “. . . as President . . . you’ll learn what a lonely job this is, and you’ll discover the need for somebody like Harry Hopkins who asks nothing except to serve you.” 3 Hopkins served as Roosevelt’s personal manager at the 1940 Democratic National Convention. During his visit to the White House in May 1940, he spent the night in a suite which at one time had been President Abraham Lincoln’s study. Hopkins would continue living in that suite, which was just down the hall from Roosevelt’s room, until December 1943.

On New Year’s Eve in 1941, Roosevelt sent Hopkins to London as his personal representative –to gain firsthand knowledge of Britain’s needs during the crucial early phase of World War II which became known as the Battle of Britain – the largest and most sustained aerial bombing campaign up to that date. Hopkins’s almost daily conversations with Churchill during the six weeks of his stay in London were the beginning of a long friendship. Hopkins was among the few people who had the privilege of addressing Churchill by his first name.

Hopkins’s reports to Roosevelt played a key role in the debate over the president’s ‘Lend-Lease’ bill to aid Britain by providing it (and eventually several other Allied nations) with weapons and supplies without requiring payment upfront. Hopkins spearheaded the rapid passage of the Lend-Lease Bill, first by the House of Representatives, on February 8, 1941, and then by the Senate a month later. Roosevelt appointed Hopkins to administer the Lend-Lease Program, with the vague authority to “advise and assist me in carrying out the responsibilities placed upon me” by the passage of the bill. 4 Although lacking the official title, Hopkins thus came to be regarded by many journalists as “deputy president.” He became famous for his unbureaucratic style and for getting things done by bypassing bureaucratic red tape. Hopkins played a pivotal role in preparing the U.S. Armed Forces and private business for war production. He was also a member of the War Production Board (WPB) and the Pacific War Council, an intergovernmental agency established in 1942 to coordinate the Allied war effort in the Pacific and Asian World War II campaigns.

Hopkins was a pioneer in establishing the practice of private diplomacy. On his missions as President Roosevelt’s personal representative, he managed to facilitate agreement on issues that would have had little chance of being resolved had the negotiations been carried out by an official diplomatic representative. Hopkins thus played a key role in facilitating accord between the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union during the war effort. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, both Roosevelt and Churchill, the British Prime Minister, saw aiding the Soviet Union as crucial to defeating Germany – provided the Soviet Union could survive the Nazi onslaught. Hopkins volunteered to fly to Moscow to find out for himself if the Soviet Union would be able to hold off the Germans.

In late July 1941, Hopkins took a 24-hour flight to Moscow, seated in the machine-gunner’s metal chair in the rear of the plane, to meet Stalin and other Soviet leaders in person. It took Hopkins just two days to dramatically increase Western understanding of the Soviet situation. “I had no conversations in Moscow,” he reported, “just six hours of conversation. After that there was no more to be said. It was all cleaned up at two sittings.” Hopkins came away convinced that the Soviet Union would be able to blunt the German advance. He also convinced Stalin of the need to call a conference of representatives of the three governments to study the strategic needs of each front in the war. The conference took place in Moscow in October 1941, and Hopkins’s efforts eventually helped Roosevelt to extend Lend-Lease legislation to aid the Soviet Union.

Hopkins and Stalin, July 1941

Many American diplomats pointed to Stalin’s special affinity for Roosevelt’s assistant. Charles Bohlen, who accompanied Hopkins to his later meetings with Stalin, as a translator, recalled that Stalin once said in his presence that Hopkins was “the first American to whom he had spoken “po dushe” – from the soul.” 5 According to Averell Harriman, Stalin displayed more open and warm cordiality to Hopkins than to any other foreigner. Throughout World War II, Hopkins continued to play a crucial personal role in Great Powers diplomacy, accompanying Roosevelt as his personal aide to the Allied conferences in Casablanca (January 4-24, 1943), Quebec (August 1943), Cairo (November 22-26, 1943), Tehran (November 28-December 1, 1943) and Yalta (February 4-11, 1945). At Yalta, Hopkins was suffering from intense pain but nevertheless participated fully in making plans for Germany’s ultimate defeat and establishing the accords for the post-war world.

At the conclusion of the conference, Hopkins was too sick to continue the trip back home with Roosevelt on board the USS Quincy cruiser and had to take a few days rest in Marrakech, Morocco before returning to the United States. Roosevelt, who had expected Hopkins to help him write a speech on the results of the conference on the way home, was disappointed. It turned out that he and Hopkins would not see each other again. On his return to the United States, Hopkins went straight to the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota. He was still there when Roosevelt died in Warm Springs, Georgia on April 12. Although too sick to give President Harry S. Truman the same kind of service he had given to Roosevelt, Hopkins undertook his last mission to Stalin in late May of 1945 – at the height of the United Nations Charter Conference at San Francisco – to iron out differences between the Allies and plan for a July meeting between Churchill, Stalin and Truman in Potsdam, Germany.

On July 2, 1945, Hopkins retired from government service. He settled in New York, but his plans to begin writing about the war and Roosevelt were frustrated by his crumbling health. In September 1945, he made what turned out to be his last trip to Washington, D.C., to receive the Distinguished Service Medal from President Truman. Two months later, Hopkins checked into New York’s Memorial Hospital, where he died on January 29, 1946.

Asked to name two Americans (besides President Roosevelt) who had made the greatest contributions to the defeat of Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill named General George Marshall among military leaders and Harry Hopkins among civilians.

Hopkins in 1941

Hopkins is remembered in Russia as a highly trusted representative of President Roosevelt who negotiated with the Soviet leadership and contributed greatly to strengthening the Russian-American partnership that had defeated the Nazis. In the memory of older generations of Russians, his name is gratefully associated with “Lend Lease” – the great American program of wartime assistance which connoted not just tanks, guns and aircraft for victory, but also canned meat, powdered milk and warm clothes at a time of dire need. After decades of silence about the American contribution to the Russian victory, we now know that every seventh Red Army aircraft, every third ton of aviation petrol and every second truck were U.S.-made. During the Yalta Conference, Stalin acknowledged that “Lend-Lease had greatly contributed to the victory,” and that without American assistance “the victory would have been different”— meaning the cost of victory in human lives.

Hopkins is remembered in modern-day Ukraine as well, to judge from a 2009 article entitled “Ukraine Needs Harry Hopkins.” Considering the personal qualities that enabled Hopkins to go down in history “as an example of a highly efficient and honest administrator” “who was able to earn the trust of such different leaders as Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt,” the writer emphasized Hopkins’s understanding of the plight of the common American, his unselfishness, his personal modesty and his ability to distance himself from politics: “Harry Hopkins had clean hands – and, most importantly, he had never strived for power.” 6

The Smearing of Harry Hopkins as a Soviet Agent

In 1990, a book written by Christopher Andrew, a British historian, and Oleg Gordievsky, a former high-level KGB officer who had defected to the West in 1985, suddenly claimed that Hopkins was “the most important of all Soviet wartime agents in the United States.” Entitled KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, and based on Gordievsky’s recollections of a lecture he heard when he was a KGB intelligence trainee, the book described how Iskhak Akhmerov, the former Soviet “illegalresident in the United States during World War II, had intimated to young KGB trainees that he had had secret meetings with Hopkins. These meetings allegedly began before Hopkins made his first trip to Moscow in July 1941 and continued throughout the war years. 7 Although Andrew and Gordievsky were immediately taken to task by some British and American authors, 8 this fantastic story, amazingly, remains unchallenged to this date. Moreover, since 1990 it has often been “serialized” in books, newspaper and magazine articles, on-line encyclopedias and postings. Recently, Gordievsky’s fable found its way into a Russian World War II espionage novel.

Following the release in 1995-1996 of Venona documents – partially decrypted Soviet intelligence communiqués from the World War II period – the late U.S. Air Force Department historian Dr. Edward Mark undertook to identify Hopkins behind the cover name “19” in a single, partially decrypted cable from May 29, 1943. The cable was signed by “Mer,” which was then Akhmerov’s cover name. 9 In this cable, Akhmerov reported information he had heard from “19” on discussions of the chances of opening a second front in Europe in 1943. These discussions took place at the conference between Roosevelt and Churchill and the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. from May 15 to May 25, 1943, commonly known by its code name, TRIDENT. At the time of the cable’s release in 1996, “19” was not identified by Venona translators, who erroneously made an assumption (and, in fact, a handwritten notation) that Hopkins was behind another cover name, “Zamestitel’,” which is Russian for “Deputy.” Dr. Mark went a step further: having consulted the TRIDENT attendance records, he concluded that “Zamestitel’” was Vice-President Henry Wallace and “Source No. 19” “was most likely” Harry Hopkins. 10

As we now know, “19” or “19th” was the cover name used for U.S. State Department official Laurence Duggan in NKVD foreign intelligence communiqués from 1936 to 1944. 11 Wallace appears as “Lotsman” [“Navigation pilot”] elsewhere in decrypted Venona cables.

Nevertheless, in his 1999 book The Sword and the Shield (this time written with another KGB defector, former KGB archivist Vassili Mitrokhin), Christopher Andrew cited Mark’s “detailed, meticulous and pervasive study” as “plausible but controversial evidence” that “Hopkins sometimes used Akhmerov as a back channel to Moscow.” In Andrew’s account, “Hopkins’s confidential information so impressed the Center that, years later, some KGB officers boasted that he had been a Soviet agent.” Andrew was careful to qualify that “these boasts were far from the truth. Hopkins was an American patriot with little sympathy for the Soviet system. But he was deeply impressed by the Soviet war effort.” 12 Andrew’s qualification notwithstanding, some authors thought that “the biggest news” in his 1999 book was the “new evidence that proves that Harry Hopkins, the closest and most influential adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, was a Soviet agent.” 13

Except for Gordievsky’s tale about Akhmerov’s lecture, however, not a single story about Hopkins as a “Soviet agent” has emanated from the ranks of former KGB officers to this day. Moreover, when interviewed on the subject, these former officers vehemently deny Gordievsky’s assertion. Former KGB operative Colonel Oleg Tsarev, for example, is known for his collaboration with two Western authors on books about the history of KGB intelligence. 14 During his time as a KGB intelligence trainee, Tsarev used to attend Akhmerov’s lectures, which he remembered vividly. Tsarev told me in an interview (which turned out to be his last one) that Akhmerov “had never named any names” in his lectures. 15

KGB Lieutenant-General Vitaly Pavlov, who supervised Akhmerov’s preparations for his second U.S. mission in 1941, as well as his early operations in the States in the first months of 1942, said much the same thing. On his return to Moscow in early 1946, Akhmerov told Pavlov “in great detail about his meetings with various political figures in the United States.” Pavlov asserted that “Akhmerov had never met with Hopkins and Hopkins had nothing to do with Soviet intelligence.” 16

Click here to read more excerpts from interviews with Lt.-Gen. Pavlov.

Moreover, the story Gordievsky told does not withstand simple documentary crosschecking. According to Gordievsky, Akhmerov’s secret meetings with Hopkins began before Hopkins made his first trip to Moscow in July 1941. But that July Akhmerov was still in Moscow – his U.S. posting was approved that month – preparing for his forthcoming trip. He did not leave Moscow until September – and reached the United States in December, after a long and roundabout trip. 17 Russian published sources unanimously place Akhmerov’s second term in the United States from 1942 to 1945 – eliminating any basis for Gordievsky’s story. 18

The improbability of Gordievsky’s story does not end with Akhmerov’s absence from the United States in 1941 – the time of his alleged initial approach to Hopkins. Explaining “the nonsense of Gordievsky’s allegation,” General Pavlov told me that due to Akhmerov’s “low social standing in the United States (small businessman) there was no chance of his ever meeting Hopkins.”

Pavlov’s oral evidence has recently been confirmed with the release of the notes on KGB intelligence files taken from 1994 to 1995 by the former KGB officer and journalist Alexander Vassiliev, in the course of his work on a Russian-American collaborative book project. Vassiliev made detailed notes on a summary report on his tenure in the United States written by Vassili Zarubin, the “legal” resident in the United States from 1942 to 1944. Zarubin wrote the report in September 1944, upon his return to Moscow. In his profile of Akhmerov’s work during that period, Zarubin wrote: “He has a very isolated lifestyle abroad, and as a rule he has no neutral connections apart from his cover. Because of this factor, ‘Mer’ [Akhmerov] meets only with our people, which creates needless risk if he is being tailed.” 19 In all of Vassiliev’s voluminous notes, there is not the slightest hint about confidential contacts between Hopkins and Akhmerov or any other Soviet intelligence operatives.

Click here to see where Hopkins appears in Alexander Vassiliev’s notes.

Nor does the possibility of a confidential relationship between Hopkins and Soviet intelligence operatives appear anywhere in Russian diplomatic files.

Click here for some of the references to Hopkins in Russian files from the World War II period.

http://www.documentstalk.com/wp/wpa-works-projects-administration
  1. Historian R. Bruce Craig noted that early experience as workers or administrators in settlement houses played a significant role in shaping “the minds and ideals” of many of the future New Dealers: “From the late 1800s through the 1920s it was not unusual for young, practical idealists interested in solving the problems of urban, industrial America to spend a year or two living and working in working-class neighborhoods. Like the Peace Corps and Vista volunteers of more recent times, settlement workers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the vanguard of reform in the progressive era.” Treasonable Doubt. The Harry Dexter White Spy Case, by R. Bruce Craig, University Press of Kansas, 2004, p. 20.
  2. Cit., The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers. “Harry Lloyd Hopkins.” Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt, ed. by Allida Black, June Hopkins, et al. (Hyde Park, New York: Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site, 2003). http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/hopkins-harry.htm (Accessed December 28, 2009
  3. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Wendell Willkie, 1941, Ibidem.
  4. Cit., Ibidem.
  5. Charles Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973, p. 244. The precise Russian equivalent of the English phrase “from the soul” is “po dusham.” – S. Ch.
  6. “Ukraine Needs Harry Hopkins and not Vladimir Litvin,” by Vladimir Bushev, February 20, 2009, http://www.politikan.com.ua/2/1/0/3182.htm
  7. KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990; New York: HarperCollins, 1990, pp. 287, 334, 349-350.
  8. In his review of Andrew and Gordievsky’s book in Spectator, November 3, 1990, British espionage journalist Phillip Knightley wrote that “a smear” of Harry Hopkins “can only be described as shameful.” In his review in The Atlantic, March 1991, American historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. concluded that the story was weakly sourced, full of contradictions and probably related to the authors’ reputed six-figure advances. http://intellit.org/alpha_folder/A_folder/andrewplus.html
  9. Venona New York to Moscow #812, May 29, 1943.
  10. Edward Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the Trident Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (April 1998), pp. 1-31.
  11. See Alexander Vassiliev’s notes on the Laurence Duggan file in his Yellow Notebook #2, pp. 1-39, posted at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.documents&group_id=511603
  12. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, by Christopher Andrew and Vassili Mitrokhin, New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 111.
  13. “The Treachery of Harry Hopkins,” by Reed Irvine and Cliff Kincaid, Media Monitor, October 8, 1999, http://www.aim.org/media-monitor/the-treachery-of-harry-hopkins/
  14. Deadly Illusions, by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, London: Century, 1993; The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Files, by Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, HarperCollins, 1998.
  15. Svetlana Chervonnaya’s interview with Oleg Tsarev, November 21, 2008, conducted for the Russian 5th (St. Petersburg) TV channel.
  16. Svetlana Chervonnaya’s interview with Lt.-Gen.Vitaly Pavlov, April 23, 2002.
  17. The dating of Akhmerov’s posting was ascertained in the course of interviews with Lt.-Gen.Vitaly Pavlov in April and May, 2002. For an additional confirmation of the December 1941 dating of Akhmerov’s arrival in the United States, see Alexander Vassiliev’s notes on a KGB 1984 instruction manual about Akhmerov’s operational experience, entitled “Station Chief Gold” (from Akhmerov’s early cover name) in Vassiliev’s Black Notebook, p. 140.
  18. Akhmerov’s bio in Russian Wikipedia, http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D1%85%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2; http://rusrazvedka.narod.ru/base/htm/ahmer.html; http://www.pobeda.ru/content/view/2093.
  19. Zarubin to Merkulov, Memorandum (on the station’s work in the country), September 1944, Alexander Vassiliev’s White Notebook # 1, p. 14. Emphasis added. – S.Ch.

Harry Hopkins: A Glimpse into the Russian Records

Harry Hopkins: A Glimpse into the Russian Records

I. Harry Hopkins in Russian Diplomatic Files

On December 1, 1938, Constantine Oumansky, then the Soviet Chargé d’affaires ad interim in the United States, wrote in his “political letter” to Maxim Litvinov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs:

… His [FDR’s] circle remains progressive, there have been no obvious shifts to the right in his domestic policy. He strongly hates the Nazis and the Japanese; however, he is getting increasingly concerned with the activation of reactionaries, which are at present mostly concentrated in the Dies Congressional Committee. …

… [The Dies Committee] has turned into an office of daily baiting of the progressive wing of [the] Roosevelt Administration, and Roosevelt obviously feels the need to publicly distance [himself] from the support on the left, although thus far he has not sacrificed his most progressive assistants like [verbatim “of the type”] Ickes [Harold L. Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior] and Hopkins. … 1

Hopkins begins to appear more frequently in Russian diplomatic files after his first visit to Moscow in late July, 1941; for example, see the reference below, “On the Issue of American Assistance to the USSR,” compiled at the NKID’s department of the Americas, dated September 21, 1941:

… The representative of the U.S. President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, who is supervising the implementation of the Lend-Lease law, in his radio address on July 27, that is, before his departure from London to Moscow, stated: “We are not forgetting about the glorious struggle of the Russian people, who are defending their Motherland. We in America are resolved to provide all possible assistance to Russia, and to do it immediately.”

In his statement to the correspondents of the foreign press on July 30, Hopkins stated that on the instruction of the President he informed Comrade Stalin that “the United States considers anyone fighting against Hitler [to be on the] righteous side in this conflict, and it is our intention to provide assistance to that side.” Hopkins also stated that, “we (in the United States) are watching the struggle of the Soviet Union in self-defense with great admiration.” 2

Judging from the Russian records, the Soviets appreciated Hopkins’s role from the very beginning. Talking to a representative of the American Red Cross, J. Nickolson [James T. Nickolson – S.Ch.], Andrey Vyshinsky, the First Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, said that “the assistance provided to the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt, who is a shrewd statesman, as well as by his associates – Hopkins, Harriman, Davies [former Ambassador to the USSR Joseph E. Davies – S. Ch.] and the others is highly appreciated.” According to Vyshinsky’s record of the conversation, “Nickolson replied that he appreciated my sincerity and that he agreed with me in full… He asked for permission to cite me in his conversation with Roosevelt, Hopkins, Wardwell and his boss, Davis [Norman Davis, chairman of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies from 1938 to 1944 – S.Ch.].” 3

Hopkins appears in the Russian files as one of the early supporters of opening a second front in Europe. See, for instance, the once Top Secret record of a conversation between Vyacheslav Molotov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, [John Gilbert] Winant, on Molotov’s visit to London in May 1942, when he was on his way to Washington, D.C.:

… Further, Winant touched upon the issue of the second front and said that Roosevelt was its zealous partisan, and that Molotov would also find full support from Hopkins and General Marshall.

As far as England is concerned, at the time of Hopkins and Marshall’s stay in London, this issue enjoyed a great deal of attention, mostly thanks to the enthusiasm and resolve of the American representatives. Following their departure, the attitude to the second front among the English government has somewhat soured…. 4

In Washington, Hopkins took part in Roosevelt’s meetings with Molotov – appearing as No 1 or No 2 on the attendance lists in the Soviet records of the conversations of May 29-30, 1942. 5

Throughout the war years, Hopkins continually appeared in Soviet diplomatic reports on Soviet-American relations among the staunchest supporters of President Roosevelt. For instance, a report on the state of Soviet-American relations, written by Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, in July 1944, summing up developments since June 1941, concluded “that Roosevelt and his Administration have taken a firm line in support of friendly relations and cooperation with the Soviet Union.” In this connection, Gromyko named Hopkins at the top of his list of Roosevelt’s “most active supporters among non-Cabinet people” – before Vice-President Wallace and future Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. 6

Hopkins continually appears in Russian diplomatic files as a final authority on American supplies to the USSR – as, for instance, in Ambassador Gromyko’s record of his conversation with Ambassador Harriman on July 31, 1944:

On July 31, I attended the dinner at the [residence of ] U.S. Ambassador Harriman. …

… Harriman remarked that Mikoyan [Anastas Mikoyan, then the People’s Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade – S. Ch.] is not completely satisfied with the response given by the American Government, because he believes that the American Government could increase its supplies of materials in excess of the 5,400 tons. Harriman informed Hopkins about the opinion expressed by Mikoyan. He has not yet received a response from Hopkins on the possibility of increasing the volume of supplies in comparison with the number indicated above. … 7

The name Harry Hopkins, written without any title, also appears on top of the lists of American participants at the Tehran and Yalta Conferences of the Big Three, as, for instance, in the list of President Roosevelt’s “personal group” at the Yalta Conference, which Harriman handed over to Molotov on January 2, 1945:

TOPSECRET

The President’s personal group will include a total of about 100. …

The President’s personal group will include:

Mr. Harry Hopkins

Vice-Admiral McIntire – Personal physician to the President

Vice-Admiral Brown – The President’s Naval Aide

Major General Watson – The President’s Military Aide and Personal Secretary

Mr. Charles E. Bohlen – Will act as an interpreter

White House Staff —- 6

Secret Service Officers 16

Servants —————— 8 8

In the course of preparations for the Yalta Conference, Ambassador Harriman requested an audience with Molotov on January 20 to talk at length about the American agenda for the conference. Molotov’s entry about the conversation in his books includes Harriman’s alert on Hopkins’s role in the coming meeting – appearing without a title or first name: “The President will also be accompanied by Hopkins who will take part in the discussion of all questions. 9

In the official Soviet communiqué on the Yalta Conference, Hopkins appears as No. 3 on the list of American participants:

From the USA:

E. Stettinius, the Secretary of State

B. Leahy, head of the President’s HQ, Fleet Admiral

H. Hopkins, Presidential Special Assistant

J. Byrnes, Judge, Director, Department of War Mobilization

G. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army

E. King, Commander-in-chief of the Navy

B. Somerwell, Commander, U.S. Army War Supplies

E. Lang, Administrator, Naval transportation

L. Cooter, Major-General

Av. Harriman, Ambassador to the USSR

Ph. Mathews, Director, European department of the State Department

A. Hiss , Deputy Director, Office on Special Political Affairs, State Department

Ch. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, along with political, military and technical advisors. 10

In addition, Hopkins’s name appears in one of the more entertaining records I discovered in the Russian Yalta files:

Phone cable, February 9, 1945, 1.30 [pm] [from the NKID, Moscow, to Yalta – S. Ch.]

Chuvakhin [Dmitry Stepanovich Chuvakhin, then an official of the NKID – S. Ch.] – to Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Comrade A. J. Vyshinsky.

In the conversation with me Pench [a garbled transmission of the name of Edward Page – S.Ch.] told me that President Roosevelt, Stettinius, Hopkins and Byrnes expressed a desire to receive a small amount of caviar, champagne, cigarettes, wines and vodka. Pench added that many other members of the American delegation were looking forward to gifts, although everybody understood that it would probably be hard to do. Speaking for himself, Pench said that the minor members of the delegation could be given vodka and cigarettes as “souvenirs,” in case there is nothing else available.

I have promised to report it to the leadership. Chuvakhin

Transmitted via government communication system. 11

This wish was immediately transmitted to Molotov and, apparently, acted upon.

A personal letter from Harry Hopkins to the Soviet Ambassador, Gromyko, discovered in the files of the Soviet Embassy in the United States, suggests a rather informal relationship between Hopkins and Gromyko. Hopkins wrote a letter on April 30, 1945 to ask Gromyko (who was then in San Francisco, attending the United Nations Charter Conference) to facilitate the issuing of a Soviet visa to the journalist Edgar Snow:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Personal

April 30, 1945

I have been laid up at home ever

since I left the hospital but I seem

to be getting a little better each day

and should be up and about before too

long now.

I surely hope that things go well

at San Francisco. It would be such a

tragic matter for the people of the

whole world if all of us fail out there.

I am sorry I could not see Mr. Molotov

while he was here and if you get a chance

will you remember me kindly to him?

Cordially yours,

Harry L. Hopkins 12

In San Francisco, Ambassador Gromyko obviously did remember Hopkins to Molotov, who wrote a private letter to Hopkins on May 5, 1945 to say that he was very sorry he hadn’t been able to see Hopkins on his brief trip to Washington before proceeding to San Francisco. 13

On the evening of Victory in Europe Day, May 8, 1945, Hopkins cabled Molotov in San Francisco. On top of the Russian translation of this cable, we see a notation in Molotov’s handwriting:

Important

UNCIO V STATE NR 20/8TH MAY 7 50PM EWT ROUTINE GF 82 BT

TO FOREIGN MINISTER MOLOTOV (PERSONAL)

FROM HARRY L. HOPKINS

MAY 8TH

THANKS SO MUCH FOR YOUR CORDIAL MESSAGE.

THIS DAY OF VICTORY OVER THE EVIL FORCES OF MANKIND WAS WON

BY MILLIONS OF ALLIED SOLDIERS AND SAILORS. IT IS THE PRELUDE, NOT

ONLY OF THE COMPLETE DISTRUCTION [sic] OF THE MILITARY MIGHT OF JAPAN, BUT

ALSO OF THE BUILDING OF A SURE FOUNDATION OF PEACE IN WHICH

THE COMMON PEOPLE OF THE EARTH SHALL SHARE THE FRUITS OF THE VICTORY.

HARRY HOPKINS 14

Hopkins appeared prominently in Russian diplomatic files for the last time between late May and early June of 1945, in connection with his last mission to Stalin as the personal representative of the president of the United States (now Harry Truman). This time, his goal was to iron out differences between the Allies over the Polish issue, which was jeopardizing the outcome of the San Francisco Conference.

On May 22, 1945, the U.S. Chargé d’affaires in Moscow, George Kennan, visited the Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Vyshinsky, to talk about the arrangements for Hopkins’s trip to Moscow. A brief record in Vyshinsky’s books says:

Reception of George Kennan, Chargé d’affaires (5 minutes).

… Hopkins is arriving in Paris accompanied by his wife approximately on May 25. Due to Hopkins’s weak health … [Kennan is] requesting to arrange for a direct flight through Berlin. 15

The Russian diplomatic protocol files recorded Vyshinsky’s arrangements for a comfortable stay in Moscow for Hopkins and his plane’s crew:

Secret, Urgent

“24” May 1945

A. Vyshinsky – to A.D. Kroutikov, Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Trade.

NKID is asking for [your] instruction to Intourist for allocating rooms at the “National” hotel for accommodation of the crew of the plane of the Personal Representative of the President of the United States – H. Hopkins who arrives in Moscow on May 26 c.[current] y. [year]. 16

A draft of the protocol for Hopkins’s welcoming ceremony in Moscow, discovered in the records of the Molotov Office, displays Vyshinsky’s last-minute editing to downplay the ceremony in comparison with the reception given to Hopkins in July 1941:

At the Central Airfield Hopkins is welcomed by:

A.J. Vyshinsky,

F.F. Molochkov [head of Protocol, NKID],

V.I. Bazykin [Assistant Head of the Department on the USA, NKID]

[The names of the Lt.-General Sinilov and M.-General Kutuzov were crossed out]

The Central Airfield is “not” [handwritten insertion] decorated with the flags of the SU and the USA. The honor guard is not [here and after, other handwritten insertions] present, national anthems are not played. … 17

Following Hopkins’s five conversations with Stalin on May 27, 28, 30 and 31, final accord was reached on June 6 – and Molotov immediately informed the Soviet ambassadors in London, Paris, Washington, D.C., Warsaw and Prague “on the agreements with H. Hopkins in the Polish question on June 6, 1945.” 18

On June 15, 1945, the Soviet daily “Izvestia” reported on President Truman’s June 13 press conference, where he recognized Hopkins’s mission to Moscow as “successful.” The article went on to cite Truman’s estimate of Hopkins’s accomplishments:

To the question if there were any changes that involved shifts in the policy of the Soviet government, Truman answered in the negative. He said that there had been amiable concessions on the part of the Russians on a number of issues of interest to Americans.

To the question if Hopkins’s activity led to the change in the positions of the Soviet delegation at San Francisco on the voting procedure in the Security Council, Truman answered with a strong affirmative. 19

Hopkins’s last mission received a rave review from the British – as seen in a record in the books of Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Ivan Maysky regarding his conversation with the British Ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, on June 13, 1945:

2. Having finished with the business part, Kerr moved on to various general topics. … He was especially happy about the prospect of a quick settlement of the Polish question. He gives great credit for it to Hopkins. Kerr even used the expression, “I wish Hopkins were English.” 20

James F. Byrnes, who became President Truman’s Secretary of State on July 3, 1945, offered another rave review of Hopkins’s last mission when he spoke at a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. on September 16, 1945. The Record of what he said was made by Molotov’s assistant:

Byrnes: … With no movement in the Polish situation [in the aftermath of the Yalta Conference – S. Ch.] … Americans got the impression that the accord on Poland had been broken. He, Byrnes, was well aware that that impression was wrong. Hopkins came to Moscow, made an agreement with Stalin, which resulted in reorganization of the Polish government that relieved the tension in the Polish question, and was welcomed by everybody.

There is no doubt that the present Polish government is friendly to the Soviet Union and that the United States are satisfied with the compromise reached. 21


II. Mentions of Harry Hopkins in Alexander Vassiliev’s Notebooks

In 1994 and 1995, Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer and journalist, took voluminous notes on KGB files in preparation for a joint Russian-American book. In these notes, Vassiliev first mentions Harry Hopkins’s name in an undated report from the early 1930s. He refers to Hopkins as an “Asst. Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade,” who is “very much in favor of normal relations with the Soviets.” 22 Hopkins next appears in an April 1937 report on the “contacts, income, etc,” of someone with the pseudonym “Nigel”, (the cover name for NKVD short-term source Michael Straight), which was forwarded to Moscow Center. [22. Ibid., White Notebook # 3, p. 113.]] In March 1939, Hopkins’s name appeared in a report on “Nigel”’s employment options written by “Jung,” then the pseudonym of the Soviet “illegalresident in the United States, Iskhak Akhmerov:

“On Nigel. … He was recently offered a job as secretary to Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins. [Rose {Roosevelt – S.Ch.} might lose the election in 1940, and Hopkins and his secretaries would leave with him. p.125] I dissuaded him from this option.” 23

Hopkins next appeared in a brief note on a September 1, 1941 report from the agent “Informator.” According to the note, “Informator” reported on “Hopkins’s impressions from his trip to Moscow.” Hopkins’s name appears again in another report from “Informator,” dated October 6, 1941, which Vassiliev summarized as follows: “On Morgenthau’s annoyance over the passive attitude of Roosevelt and Hopkins toward real assistance to the USSR.” 24

The importance of Vassiliev’s notes cannot be underestimated in considering the allegations that Hopkins was an agent of Soviet intelligence, which have at their source a 1990 book, KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, written by Christopher Andrew, a British historian, and Oleg Gordievsky, a former high-level KGB officer who had defected to the West in 1985.

Vassiliev’s notes on an “orientation” (that is, a memo written for the information of intelligence officers) on “Political and diplomatic line of work” [LINK to the image of the 1st page of the document], compiled in Moscow in April 1942 by a young NKGB operative, Vitaly Pavlov, are unequivocal on one significant point: that at the time the document was written, Hopkins was not a contact of Soviet intelligence – or even a recruitment target:

On the White House’s work: Those working are personally acquainted with Roosevelt (Morgenthau, Hopkins, Ickes, Welles, etc.) through personal contacts, oral reports, and personal envoys.

They avoid using channels like the Departments of State, War, the Navy, etc., in order to maintain secrecy. “Therefore it is understood that the aim of our day-to-day work is to infiltrate Roosevelt’s own circle.” So far there are no agents, but there are means of approach. One of Roosevelt’s secretaries, “Page,” (Page)] is being used without his knowledge.

Lead: to recruit Harry Hopkins’ secretary through the source “Diana.” 25

Click here to compare Alexander Vassiliev’s notes on Vitaly Pavlov’s orientation with my translation of the actual full-length document

Vassiliev’s notes on a 1943 “Plan for reinforcing the intelligence work” in the United States also make it clear that, after the passage of a year, the Soviets still did not have any agents from “the circles of such individuals as Hopkins.” They did not even have “suitable cadres of qualified workers, capable of overseeing prominent and respectable agents” from such circles. 26

On March 3, 1944, “Mer” (a code name for Akhmerov) reported to Moscow on a letter sent to Hopkins by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, protesting against an earlier agreement on wartime cooperation between the OSS and NKGB foreign intelligence. Akhmerov gives no hint in his report that Hopkins might have been his source. 27 Moreover, if Hopkins had ever been Akhmerov’s contact – not to mention his agent – his name would have been hidden behind a pseudonym.

Hopkins’s name is mentioned again in the clear in a December 12, 1944 report by the Soviet People’s Commissar of State Security (GB), Vsevolod Merkulov, which was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. Moreover, Hopkins’s name appears in a British diplomatic communiqué on the appointment of Edward Stettinius as the new U.S. Secretary of State, which was “obtained in London through an agent”:

The most important and immediate result of this appointment is a closer relationship between the State Department and the White House, which undoubtedly is a positive development. Stettinius is a loyal protégé of Hopkins and never forgets it… The president’s intention now to conduct his own foreign policy is becoming increasingly noticeable, Hopkins’s old (New Deal) prejudices against the bureaucratism of the State Department, at least recently, have faded, and he is working with individual leaders of the department on a wider scale than before. This tactics will be implemented even on a wider scale after Stettinius’s appointment. Since the important strategic posts have been filled by such people as Forrestal, Harriman and now by Stettinius (Forrestal is the US Navy secretary; Harriman, the US ambassador to the USSR—our note15), the White House and Hopkins in particular are getting more complete control than ever…” 28

If Hopkins had been in contact with Akhmerov, it would have been more natural for Akhmerov to get this information directly from him, rather than in a roundabout way through London.

This was obviously not the case, since, according to Vassiliev’s notes, the NKGB relied on “Homer,”, its British source in Washington, D.C., to evaluate the effect of Hopkins’s mission to Moscow at the height of the San Francisco Conference. A report sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria on June 15, 1945 said in part:

The Hopkins mission and the reports of the cordial reception he got from Stalin had a calming effect, and the Amer. govt. clearly sensed that the anti-Russian campaign had become so acrimonious that the need has arisen for restraining measures. As a result there have been a number of engineered statements aimed at calming the atmosphere. The most important of these statements was an address by Stettinius—a model of caution and tact. 29

Hopkins appears in Vassiliev’s notebooks for the last time in the notes on a February 1952 report about a visit by someone hidden behind the cover name “Miron” to the office of a certain “Synok” [“Sonny”]. In Vassiliev’s notebooks, “Synok” was a cover name of Victor J. Hammer, a businessman who founded and owned the Hammer Galleries in New York City. The visit took place in Hammer’s office at the galleries, which were then located at 51 East 57th Street. “Sonny” is described as a person who was “auctioning off Roosevelt’s personal belongings” at that time: “He is well acquainted with Roosevelt’s wife and with R.’s former adviser Hopkins. He has also sold his [Hopkins’s] belongings and valuable gifts received when he carried out special missions.” 30 Again, there is no hint of any past “special relationship” between Hopkins and NKVD foreign intelligence.


III. KGB Lt.-General Vitaly Pavlov on Allegations Made by Oleg Gordievsky

KGB Lt.-General Vitaly Pavlov (1914-2005) personally supervised the operations of Iskhak Akhmerov, the Soviet “illegal” resident in the United States, in 1939 and again from December 1941 until mid-1942. From the time of Akhmerov’s return to Moscow from his first U.S. mission, in the end of 1939, until his departure for his second mission, in late 1941, Pavlov – who was deputy head and then head of the KGB’s American section – was Akhmerov’s formal boss, and Akhmerov reported to him. Pavlov used to study Akhmerov’s operational file, as well as the files of his assistants and agents. Hence, Pavlov’s knowledge of the relationship – or, more truly, non-relationship – between Akhmerov and Harry Hopkins was firsthand.

Pavlov had a definite opinion about the allegation that Akhmerov had used Hopkins as a back channel, which appeared in the book KGB: The Inside Story of Its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (1990). Pavlov said the following in interviews I conducted with him in April and May of 2002 (A. stands for Answer, Q. for Question):

A. … Gordievsky, the traitor, alleged that Akhmerov met with Hopkins, shook his hand and thanked him. I am saying that it is absurd! Akhmerov could not have met Hopkins and Hopkins never had anything to do with our intelligence.

Q. What is the source of your insistence that Akhmerov never met with Harry Hopkins and with Alger Hiss?

A. First, beginning in early 1939, as deputy head of the American section, I naturally read the materials which came from our residencies [stations] in the United States, including the illegal station headed by Akhmerov. After Akhmerov was recalled from the United States at the end of 1939 and particularly after he had been assigned to my section in early 1940…, he would tell me in great detail about his meetings in the United States. I was, naturally, interested in his intelligence capabilities…. Further, I was directly involved in the preparations for Akhmerov’s return to the United States – and supervised his operations in the first months of 1942, before I left for Canada in the summer of 1942…. During my time in Canada as NKGB “legal resident,” I was well-informed on the situation in the United States, because I used to come to New York from Canada from time to time…. At the time of [Gordievsky’s] allegation about Hopkins [1990], we made a detailed check into Akhmerov’s circumstances in that period [and concluded]: there was no chance that Akhmerov had ever participated in any meeting at which Hopkins could have been present. Due to his [Akhmerov’s] low social standing [in the United States] – petty businessman – there was no chance of his ever meeting Hopkins. … The nonsense [of Gordievsky’s allegations] was obvious. …

… To facilitate the Soviet Government’s relationship with the Roosevelt Administration [during World War II – S.Ch.] we did use our agents in U.S. government agencies … to obtain information on positions of certain individuals. … [For instance,] we were interested in people who came [to Russia] on missions – like Hopkins – [to ascertain] what their position and role was. But there was never any talk of their recruitment. …

Q. Speaking of the World War II period: to what extent was intelligence used as [a] back channel of communication between Stalin and Roosevelt? … Was there any participation of your intelligence service … to facilitate Stalin’s contacts with people like Hopkins?

A. Intelligence – no. Intelligence could have played a preliminary role by providing information about these people – their attitudes, their position, the chances of establishing cooperation with them, etc.

Q. Still, was Harry Hopkins an NKVD agent?

A. By no means! I have already said – I have written it in my memoirs – that Gordievsky, the traitor, alleged that Akhmerov shook hands with Harry Hopkins and thanked him for his assistance. It never happened – and was impossible! In the United States there was no chance for him [Akhmerov] to meet Hopkins – considering his circumstances and konspiratsija [secrecy rules] and his [Akhmerov’s] particular missions. 31

  1. The Political Letter of the Soviet Chargé d’affaires ad interim in the USA C.A. Oumansky to the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov on the foreign policy of the USA, Washington, December 1, 1938, Fund 05 (the Secretariat of Litvinov), description 18, P. 147, folder 132 (“Informational letters of SU Ambassador in the USA Trojanovsky and Chargé d’affaires Oumansky, January, 26 – December 1, 1938”), pp. 102-103, AVP RF.
  2. Fund 06, description 3, P. 21, folder 281, p. 67; published in Sovetsko-Amerikanskie otnoshenija: 1939-1945, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratija”, 2004, No 48, s. 143. (Soviet-American Relations: 1939-1945, Moscow: International Foundation “Democracy,” 2004, No. 48, p. 143.
  3. Record of conversation of the First Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Ja. Vyshinsky with the representative of the American Red Cross J. Nickolson…, November 22, 1941, Kuibyshev, Secret, Fund 06, description 3, P. 4, folder 31, pp. 142-144; published in Soviet-American Relations: 1939-1945, Op. cit., No 63, pp. 177-178.
  4. Record of conversation between the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J. [John Gilbert] Winant, London, May 24, 1942, Top Secret, Fund 06, description 4, P. 5, folder 51, p. 3; published in Soviet-American Relations: 1939-1945, Op. cit., No. 90, p. 230.
  5. Fund 06, description 4, P. 6, folder 60, pp. 2, 27-31.
  6. Gromyko to Molotov, July 14, 1944, with attached report “On Soviet-American Relations,” Fund 06, description 6, P. 45, folder 603, p. 7.
  7. Record of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR in the USA A.A. Gromyko with the U.S. Ambassador in the USSR A. Harriman on American supplies to the USSR…, July 31, 1944, Fund 05, description 6, P. 45, folder 64, pp. 11, 15; published in Soviet-American Relations: 1939-1945, Op. cit., No 248, pp. 564, 566.
  8. Fund 06, description 7a, P. 57, folder 9 (“The Crimean Conference, 1945. Minutes of conversations and correspondence of comrade V.M. Molotov with U.S. Ambassador Harriman in connection with preparation for the Crimean Conference, December 27,1944 – January 20,1945”), p. 7; cited from the original in English.
  9. From the books of V.M. Molotov, reception of the U.S. Ambassador Harriman, January 20, 1945, Fund 06, description 7a, P. 57, folder 9, pp. 10-11; from the original in Russian.
  10. “Konferentsija glav treh sojuznyh derzhav – Sovetskogo Sojuza, Soedinennyh Shtatov Ameriki i Velikobritanii (ofitsial’noe kommunike).” Sovetsko-Amerikanskie otnoshenija v dogovorakh, soglashenijah i deklaratsijah, Antologija dokumentov, tom II (1944-ijun’ 1946), Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, Moskva, 1946, Fond 0129, opis’ 29, Papka 335, delo 2, ss. 65-66. (“The Conference of the Heads of the Three Allied Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain in the Crimea. (The official communiqué),” Soviet-American Relations in Treaties, Agreements and Declarations, The Anthology of Documents, Vol. II (1944 – June 1946), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Moscow, 1946, Fund 0129, description 29, P. 335, folder 2, pp. 65-66.
  11. Fund 06, description 7a, P. 58, folder 10 (“Crimean Conference, 1945”), p. 12.
  12. Fund 0192 (The Soviet Embassy in the USA), description 12, P. 88, folder 32 (“International Organizations”), February 14 – December 29, 1945, p. 27.
  13. V.M. Molotov – to Hopkins, May 5, 1945, Fund 0129 (Information on the USA), description 29, P. 172, folder 45 (“Correspondence and materials for the Conference in San Francisco, February 17 – December 30, 1945”), p. 184; cited from the Russian unsigned original.
  14. Fund 06, description 7, P. 43, folder 670 (“Note correspondence of V.M. Molotov with Stettinius, Hopkins, Hull, Davies, Hallifax,” Vol. VI, April 20 –June 16, 1945”), pp. 47-48.
  15. From Vyshinsky’s diary, May 22, 1945, Fund 0129, description 29, P. 166, folder 4 (“Minutes of conversations of the Minister and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs,” February 8-November 16, 1945), p. 33.
  16. Fund 057 (Protocol Department), description 25, P. 123, folder 8 (“The visits of foreign government officials and delegations to the USSR”), p. 4.
  17. “The Protocol of Hopkins’ forthcoming meeting,” [typed text with hand-written editing], Fund 06, description 7, P. 44, folder 689 (“The visit of H. Hopkins, Personal Envoy of Truman,” May 27 – June 13, 1945”; the file was once designated Top Secret), pp. 50-51.
  18. Fund 06, description 7, P. 46, folder 728, p. 55; published in Soviet-American Relations: 1939-1945, Op. cit., No. 317, pp. 695-696.
  19. Izvestia, 15 June, 1945, Cit. in Fund 06, description 7, P. 12, folder 128 (News Items [“Chronicle”]. Vol. V, June 1-29, 1945, pp. 55, 60.
  20. Fund 0129, description 29, P. 166, folder 4 (“Minutes of conversations of the Minister and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, February, 8 – November 16, 1945”), p. 41.
  21. Reception of Byrnes at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, September 16, 1945, Fund 06, description 7, P. 43, folder 678 (“Records of conversations of Comrade Molotov with Harriman, Byrnes and Truman, Vol. II, July, 7 –September, 30, 1945”), pp. 54-55.
  22. Alexander Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #4, p. 28.
  23. Jung to the Center, March 1, 1939, Ibid., p. 120.
  24. Reports from “Informator,” Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #1, pp. 22, 26.
  25. Black Notebook, pp. 42-43.
  26. Ibid., p. 44.
  27. White Notebook #1, p. 87.
  28. Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov, Beria, December 12, 1944, Yellow Notebook #4, p. 38.
  29. Vsevolod Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and Beria, June 15, 1945, Yellow Notebook #4, p. 122.
  30. New York to Moscow, February 7, 1952, White Notebook #2, p. 116.
  31. Lt.-General Vitaly Pavlov’s interviews with Svetlana Chervonnaya, Moscow, April 22, 23, 26, May 7, 2002.

Lun’ [Lun]

In Venona decryptions, a cover name for Edward Stettinius, the U.S. Secretary of State in 1944 and 1945.

Gomer [Homer]

An NKGB foreign intelligence cover name appearing in a number of Soviet intelligence World War II period cables from 1944, which were partially decrypted in the course of the American Venona operation, and released in 1995-1996. At the time of this release, “Gomer” was identified by Venona translators as Donald Duart Maclean, a British diplomat and a long-time Soviet agent, a member of the famous “Cambridge Five” group of agents. From 1944 to 1948 Maclean served in Washington, D.C. as Secretary at the British Embassy and later as Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Development.

Informator [Informer]

An NKGB foreign intelligence cover name appearing in the notes on KGB foreign intelligence files taken in the mid-1990s by the former KGB officer and journalist Alexander Vassiliev. Identified as Bruce Minton, which was a CPUSA penname of a writer Richard Bransten – the heir of coffee magnate M.J. Brandenstein, who was writing under the name of Bruce Minton for the leftist New Masses magazine until he was ousted from the Communist Party in 1946. In Russian, the word “informator” has two meanings: 1) an individual who informs on something, passes some information – translated into English as “informer”, “communicant”, “relator”, etc. depending on the context; 2) police secret information source [osvedomitel’] – translated into English as Confidential Informant. In case of Richard Bransten, the translation “Informer” looks more proper.

Dies Committee

A common nickname for the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) from 1938 to 1944. The name was derived from that of the committee’s chairman, Martin Dies Jr., a Texas politician and Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Established as a special investigating committee of the House of Representatives, the Dies Committee was originally supposed to focus chiefly on Nazi and Ku Klux Klan activities in the United States. However, Dies and his committee became known for their fixation on ferreting out Communists in U.S. government agencies.