The BALTIMORE DOCUMENTS: A Legal Issue

One of the most important elements of the landmark Hiss-Chambers case was a sheaf of papers called the Baltimore Documents, which were considered unassailable evidence of Hiss’s espionage for the Soviet Union. But were these papers really so damning? And is the case really closed?

There is no shortage of documentation and literature on the most critical evidence presented in the landmark perjury trials of Alger Hiss – the so-called “Baltimore Documents.” The story begins in August 1948, when Whittaker Chambers, an ex-Communist turned Time-Life editor, charged Alger Hiss, a New Deal lawyer and diplomat and one of the architects of the United Nations, with belonging to the Communist Party in the 1930s. Hiss denied the charges and sued Chambers for libel.

On November 17, 1948, in the course of a pre-trial deposition in Baltimore, Chambers produced a collection of copies or summaries of U.S. government documents, which he said he had secreted away as a “life preserver” from January to mid-April 1938, while planning his defection from the Communist cause. Most of the Baltimore Documents were typed summaries or verbatim copies of State Department documents, which Chambers claimed he had received from Alger Hiss for the Soviet military intelligence service, commonly known as the GRU. Ever since Alger Hiss’s perjury prosecution in 1949-1950, it has become a virtual consensus that “the Baltimore documents… were evidence of betrayal of U.S. diplomatic information to a foreign power, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” 1

CLICK HERE to read excerpts from Whittaker Chambers’ grand jury testimony, Dec 1948-Jan 1949.

Alger Hiss was tried and convicted not of espionage, due to the statute of limitations on such cases, but of perjury. For this reason, the legal trail of evidence would not be reliably investigated according to routine procedure for espionage cases. Instead of going into complicated legal detail, however, let us go back to early 1947, when the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice were considering the possibility of prosecuting more than a dozen suspects on charges of espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage, based on evidence provided by another witness – Elizabeth Bentley. Reporting to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on a meeting in the Attorney General’s office, Hoover’s deputy E.A. Tamm wrote:

There was a considerable discussion about the possibility of prosecuting for espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage, and I expressed your view that the facts in this case would not sustain such prosecution and pointed out that if corroboration was developed, it would only corroborate trips to New York or from New York to Washington, quasi-social meetings in New York or Washington, and other secondary items without once permitting the definite identification of a secret, confidential or restricted item which had been conveyed to an agent of a foreign government with knowledge or intent to harm the United States or to aid a foreign government. I pointed out that the success of prosecution in this case would hang by the thread of the testimony of a single informant… 2

Hoover’s view was, in turn, based on an “objective analysis of this case from a legal and investigative standpoint” conducted by a Justice Department legal expert named E.P. Morgan, at the FBI’s request. 3

Morgan began his memorandum with the statement that “what we know to be true in this case is a far cry from what we are in a position to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Morgan therefore advised the FBI as follows:

In considering the possibility of successfully proceeding under the espionage statutes, the following questions appear pertinent:

(1) Does the evidence now available establish the obtaining of information with respect to the National Defense of the United States with the intent or reason to believe such information would be used to the injury of the United States, and/or for the benefit of a foreign country?

Answering this question in the negative with regard to Bentley’s evidence, Morgan specifically emphasized “a complete blank at the receiving end of information obtained by Gregory…” By “receiving end,” Morgan meant foreign, in this case, Soviet, intelligence. Gregory was Bentley’s cover name in FBI files dating from late 1945 to early 1949.

In real terms, this “complete blank” did not mean that the FBI had no knowledge of at least some of the Soviet intelligence operatives in the United States who were receiving information that Bentley claimed her “principal,” Jacob Golos, had obtained for the Soviets. On the contrary, with the exception of a few “illegal” operatives, the FBI kept track of most of the residents and operatives involved, and thus was able to identify most of Bentley’s contacts, whom she knew only under their cover names. The issue, as stated by Morgan, was that:

… Where it [information] went from Golos et al we cannot prove …

Morgan explained this lack of the proof needed to sustain prosecution for espionage by the fact that the Bureau had not made contact with Bentley until after her defection, when the activity she testified to had ceased to exist:

… Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in….

The second issue raised by Morgan was:

(2) Does the evidence available show that the subjects had lawful or unlawful possession of any document or note pertaining to the National Defense and (a) willfully transmitted or attempted to transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or (b) willfully retained the same and failed to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it?

Morgan explained that, “Certainly the document must be produced or identified with sufficient definity to show by other facts that it did, in fact, relate to the National Defense. …”

The third indispensable element in prosecuting espionage cases outlined by Morgan was that of “intent:”

… intent or reason to believe such information will be used to the injury of the United States, and/or for the benefit of a foreign country” is an essential element of this offense.

In the case of two “informational” groups that Bentley described as Soviet sources, one headed by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and another by Victor Perlo, Morgan did not see “any evidence from which ‘intent or reason to believe’ can be proven or reasonably inferred… We can identify their Communist connections but this does not supply the requisite intent or reason to believe under the statutes.”

Neither did Morgan see any chance to draw a connection between Bentley’s belief that the final destination of information was the Soviet government and any “intent” on the part of the members of the said groups:

… [Gregory’s] belief [that the information] would be used by Soviet intelligence is not binding on the other co-conspirators, …

Under the weight of Morgan’s legal analyses, the U.S. Department of Justice came to the conclusion that, with respect to Bentley’s testimony, there was no case “which could be prosecuted.” 4

To date I have not come across any analyses of the prospects for prosecuting Hiss under the espionage statute, but the problems would have been similar. If the statute of limitations had not intervened, would the government have had a chance of winning an espionage case against Hiss?

When Chambers produced the Baltimore Documents, the element that had been so obviously missing from Bentley’s testimony was finally in place: “a secret, confidential or restricted item” alleged to have been “conveyed to an agent of a foreign government.”

As far as this “secret, confidential or restricted item” is concerned, it seems clear from the literature on the Alger Hiss case that the government’s investigation revolved around this particular issue. The major questions pursued after Chambers produced the Baltimore Documents – and subsequently in the course of the two Alger Hiss perjury trials – appear to be:

1) Were the Baltimore Documents actually either copies or originals of State Department documents?

Research at the State Department has answered this question in the positive. Most of the papers produced by Chambers turned to be either copies or summaries (mostly typed, but some hand-written) of State Department documents.

2) Did Hiss have access to these documents during his time as an aide to Assistant Secretary of State Francis Sayre?

It turned out that most of the Baltimore Documents, but not all, did at some point pass through the office of Francis Sayre, so Hiss had potential access to them.

3) Was it really Hiss who hid the documents and then delivered them to Chambers?

As more than ten years had passed since the alleged transfer of documents, the government was in the position of being “on the outside looking in” to a much greater extent than was true with Bentley. In the Bentley case, the investigation began in November 1945, while the network was still functioning (although its operations were seized two weeks after Bentley came to the FBI).

Given these questions, a major effort was made to tie Hiss to the production of the Baltimore Documents.

Among the typed papers produced by Chambers were four handwritten notes. The FBI experts determined that these notes were written in Hiss’s handwriting. However, can this fact serve as direct proof of “intent to harm the United States or to aid a foreign government”? The circumstantial evidence produced in the course of the government investigation and two trials has not provided a conclusive answer.

In the case of the typewritten copies and document summaries, the government tried to establish that they had been typed on a machine once owned by the Hisses – and unearthed by Hiss’s defense attorneys in 1949. But would an affirmation by the FBI that the documents had been typed on the Woodstock N 230099 machine discovered by the Hiss defense, stand in an espionage prosecution as evidence that they “had been conveyed to an agent of a foreign government with knowledge or intent to harm the United States or to aid a foreign government”?

During Alger Hiss’s two perjury trials, an apparent answer to this question was provided by the mysterious figure of Colonel Bykov, whom Chambers described as his Soviet principal in an espionage operation.

Since mid-November 1948, “Colonel Boris Bykov” has been written into the annals of American history as “the chief agent for Russian military intelligence in the U.S. during the late 1930s.” 5 In his biography of Whittaker Chambers, Sam Tanenhaus writes that “Boris Bykov, a GRU agent from Odessa … had come to the United States in the summer [of 1936], with orders to supervise the whole of the country’s Soviet military intelligence operations.” 6

CLICK HERE to see how this description fits with Russian documentation that became available in the 1990s.

Tanenhaus also cites Chambers’s sworn testimory before Hiss’s lawyers on November 17, 1948, in which Chambers told how, in early 1937, he had “brought Alger Hiss together with a Soviet agent, Boris Bykov, for the purpose of asking Hiss to furnish State Department documents to the apparatus. Hiss agreed on the spot and soon “began a fairly consistent flow of such material….” 7

Hiss consistently maintained, however, that he had not met or heard of any Russian named Boris Bykov — or Peter, a cover name “Bykov” used, according to Chambers. He held to this position in his interview with the FBI on December 4, 1948, his grand jury testimony and his two perjury trials.

On December 6, 1948, Chambers began testifying before a special federal grand jury in New York City. Headed by Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas J. Donegan, then a special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, this grand jury had been hearing evidence on charges of Soviet espionage for many months – and was scheduled to “go out of existence” on December 15 since it had not been able to produce any indictments. Soon after Chambers turned over the Baltimore documents, however, the Department of Justice decided to present his allegations and evidence for consideration by that same grand jury.

On December 7, Chambers told Thomas J. Donegan that about once a week throughout 1937 and the first months of 1938, he had delivered film with information provided by members of his group to “Colonel Bykov.” 8

Donegan was no stranger to the case. A former top Communist expert in the FBI’s New York Office, he had formerly headed the Bureau’s “Comintern Apparatus Squad,” investigating Communist activities – and had had access to records regarding Communist espionage. Beginning in November 1945, Donegan’s “special assignment” was handling all phases of the espionage investigation of the charges by another defector from the Soviet cause, Elizabeth Bentley9

CLICK HERE for a closer look at interesting episodes from Donegan’s FBI career, as shown in F.B.I. files.

It is worth noting that in March 1948 it was Donegan who “decided against any attempt to have Chambers appear” before the special grand jury he handled. In Donegan’s opinion, Chambers’s testimony would not be helpful. 10 On October 14, 1948, however, Chambers finally testified before the grand jury. Donegan, who had been in “close liaison” with the FBI, advised its New York office that “there is no question but that Chambers has a ‘loose memory’ and, though cooperative, is a rather difficult witness because of his definite recollection of some somewhat unimportant things and a lack of memory concerning situations that a man of his education and background should readily recollect.” 11

Donegan’s task was to ” patch” Chambers’s “loose memory” and, in particular, to fix the “receiving end” of Chambers’s espionage story – particularly after Chambers’s testimony of December 8, 1948, when, as we shall see below, his Russian receiving end, Colonel Bykov, faded into darkness.

Under examination by Assistant U.S. Attorney Raymond Whearty, it turned out that identification of Chambers’s Russian “receiving end” was hanging by a thin thread – Chambers’s belief that Bykov “was supposed to be connected with a section of their [Russian] Intelligence service.” It was further revealed that Chambers had arrived at this belief not in the course of his contacts with Bykov, whom he said he knew only as “Peter,” but months after his defection from the Communist cause. Chambers testified that he learned the name of his mysterious contact in “1937- early 1938” from former Soviet spymaster Walter Krivitsky, who defected to the West in late 1937 and arrived in the United States by the end of 1938. Asked if he had any knowledge, beyond what he later learned from Krivitsky, of “whether or not Bykov was in fact a colonel”, Chambers replied:

No, I base that knowledge wholly and solely upon what Walter Krivitsky told me.

Asked further if at any time he “saw any credentials or any evidence that he [Bykov] was connected with the Russian Government,” Chambers conceded:

None whatsoever.

At this point, Thomas Donegan intervened to question Chambers:

Q What did Colonel Bikov [sic in the transcript] say to you, with reference to his position or what work he was doing?

A I don’t know that he ever said anything specific about it. It was implicit in the relationship.

Q Well, at any time would it appear that it would be natural for you to have some sort of a discussion, although you might not go into it in detail?

A We discussed the kind of material that Bikov wanted, but the purpose of the material I don’t think we discussed at all.

Q Did he ever tell you what he was doing with the material?

A No, he did not. …

Q Did you ever use the title “Colonel” in speaking to him?

A I knew him under the pseudonym of “Peter.” I never knew he had the title “Colonel” at that time, and he never had a military appearance.12

CLICK HERE to see more of Chambers’s grand jury testimony about the Russian end of his enterprise – and Assistant U.S. Attorney Donegan’s efforts to draw him out.

Despite Donegan’s persistent questioning of Chambers, a connection between Chambers’s ex post facto “belief” and the “knowledge or intent to harm the United States or to aid a foreign government” on the part of Alger Hiss and any of Chambers’s other alleged sources was never made. To quote Justice Department expert E.P. Morgan once again, several months of investigation and two Alger Hiss perjury trials had left “a complete blank at the receiving end of information.” Historians and writers have been wrestling over this blank for decades.

Since the early 2000s, I have been trying to fill in this blank at the “receiving end” – the former Soviet Union. Of course, a quick and easy way would be to search the records of the Russian military intelligence service – the GRU. However, those records remain off limits to any outside researcher, and there is no reason to expect this situation to change in the foreseeable future. Still, like any intelligence service, the GRU did not operate in an institutional vacuum, but was part and parcel of the Soviet government machine. Data from intelligence sources was routinely reported to top Communist Party and Soviet government leaders. For the period between 1937 and early 1938, when Chambers claimed that Hiss was providing documents to the Soviet military intelligence service, the logical recipients of at least some of his input would have been the following:

  • Joseph Stalin, then General Secretary of the Central Communist Party Committee, the de facto head of the Soviet State;
  • Vyacheslav Molotov, then Chairman of Sovnarcom, the popular name for the Soviet Government until 1946; and
  • Maxim Litvinov, then Narcom of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet counterpart of the U.S. Secretary of State.

Although some of Stalin’s records are still off limits at the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP RF), the main body of the Stalin collection has been publicly accessible since 1998 at the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, commonly known as RGASPI. 13 This includes two voluminous files (numbers 187-188) containing Russian “translations of foreign diplomatic documents” (a euphemism for secret documentation obtained through agent sources), as well as cover letters and memos from the submitting intelligence officers. The last of these files – number 188 – contains documents dated from February 1934 to December 1937, and therefore is of little use for cross-checking the Baltimore Documents, which cover the period from January to mid-April, 1938. However, this collection, containing the “cream” of the intelligence reports and documentation that Stalin assigned to his private papers, is an important reference point for the type – and format – of information Stalin requested from his intelligence services.

The name of Vyacheslav Molotov appears second on Soviet-period “top secret” document distribution lists. Molotov was also the primary recipient of a great many documents, the most important of which he would routinely report on to Stalin. Since late 2006, Molotov’s private papers have been accessible at RGASPI; 14 a smaller portion of the Molotov papers is still kept off limits at the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP RF.)

The Office (Secretariat) of Maxim Litvinov was a destination for intelligence reports and documentation of any relevance to the conduct of foreign policy. These documents reside at the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) 15, which is an important background and reference source.

The scope of Russian archival sources that I have scoured in the attempt to fill in the gap on the “receiving end” of the Baltimore documents is not limited to these three major collections. I have also searched through other relevant AVP RF and Communist Party collections, as well as the collection of the VOKS (Vsesoyuznoe obschestvo kul’turnykh svyazej – the All-Union Society for Cultural Contacts) at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). 16

To get a better sense of what went on at the “receiving end,” I have also conducted in-depth interviews with two veterans from the late 1930s and early 1940s, from both branches of the Soviet intelligence services.

Some of the findings on the “receiving end” also required follow-up research in the U.S. State Department collections at the U.S. National Archives (NA) in College Park, Maryland.

This research on the alleged “receiving end” of the Baltimore Documents is an ongoing project and may take considerable time to complete. There will probably be more records to search through in Russia and follow up on in the United States. This venture of mine appears to be the first research on these historical records ever conducted at the “receiving end,” and it may be further expanded, amended or detailed if more previously undisclosed records are discovered. Meanwhile, let us take a first look at what the documents say in the case of two of the four notes in Alger Hiss’s handwriting that turned up among the Baltimore documents.

The Four Notes in Alger Hiss’ Handwriting

The four notes in Alger Hiss’s handwriting that turned up among the Baltimore Documents included a summary of a January 28, 1938 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the U.S. Department of State – and three handwritten notes which summarized parts of other cables received at the U.S. State Department from its foreign outposts in early March 1938.

Testifying before the grand jury in December 1948, Chambers said that, although as of November 1948 he “didn’t remember” about the envelope with documents he secreted in 1938, he did remember that he “had secreted the specimens of handwriting” of Alger Hiss – although he remembered “practically nothing” about their nature. Questioned further by Thomas Donegan, Chambers “seemed to remember” that the handwritten documents were given to him by Hiss in his house on 30th Street in Washington, D.C. … “for Colonel Bikov.” 17

Alger Hiss would later acknowledge that he wrote these notes – but would deny that he had ever furnished them to Chambers. Testifying before two grand juries 18 and then in two perjury trials, he would explain that he “made notes of that kind quite frequently,” [18. Testimony of Alger Hiss, December 15, 1948. – Ibid., p. 4494.]] writing such memos “for his own use” so that he could brief Assistant Secretary of State Sayre, his boss from 1936 to 1939, on departmental dispatches passing through the office.

CLICK HERE to learn more on Hiss’s grand jury testimony.

Hiss told his attorneys that although Sayre’s area of responsibility was international economics and trade, particularly international economic agreements, “he was interested in subsidiary matters as they affected neutrality, the Philippines or the League of Nations.” Besides, Hiss added, he “was naturally very much interested in the developments of the Sino-Japanese war as they affected the military security of the Philippines.” 19

In his 1978 book, Perjury, Allen Weinstein argues that Francis Sayre did not support Hiss’s explanation about summarizing cables for briefing purposes, citing FBI and Hiss defense records of late 1948-1949 to make his case. 20 However, at the time he wrote Perjury (and when he wrote the revised 1998 edition), Weinstein had no access to the grand jury records in the Alger Hiss case, which were not released until October, 1999. Now we finally have access to Francis Sayre’s initial, unprompted grand jury testimony – evidence not blurred or contaminated by FBI interviews, questioning by Hiss’s defense attorneys or cross-examination in the second Hiss perjury trial.

Although Sayre said in his December 22, 1948 grand jury testimony that he had “no recollection” of any of Alger Hiss’s handwritten notes, he explained:

…it was our practice in the State Department often to make little penciled memoranda, giving the reaction of the individual who read a long cable or a document or a file, giving his reaction on what should be done, or whether the paper was correct, in the procedure which it suggested.

And those little penciled memoranda, which were similar in appearance to those [Hiss’s handwritten notes], would often be attached to the file as it passed from division to division in the State Department.

Sayre further explained:

… the number of telegrams pouring into my office was so great that I had to have somebody sieve those telegrams and give to me the important ones, and in certain cases, if they were long telegrams or memoranda, often tell me what they were and whether in their opinion I should read them or not. … Not that he would show me or pass to me those specific memoranda, but possibly that he would digest it for his own purposes, so that in handing me a stack of telegrams he might just glance at his little digest and say, “Well, this telegram is about so-and-so; I don’t think you have to read that.” “This telegram is about so-and-so; perhaps you better get after that.” And so on and so forth. 21

When asked if he would have been interested in matters not directly involved with the economic and trade matters his office was handling, Sayre explained that he “had to be interested in everything that pertained to developments going along,…” 22

CLICK HERE to read more of Francis Sayre’s grand jury testimony.

Francis Sayre’s explanation of Hiss’s practice of making little penciled memoranda to himself was confirmed by the testimony of Annabelle Newcomb, Sayre’s secretary in 1948, who had been a clerk-stenographer in Sayre’s office from 1936 to 1939. Asked what “the procedure was in Mr. Sayre’s office in the handling of documents,”she explained to the grand jury:

…telegrams generally were taken in to Mr. Hiss to be screened and then taken in to Mr. Sayre. …there were so many telegrams coming in, and I think at one time Mr. Sayre asked him [Hiss] to summarize the telegrams very briefly so that when he went through them it wouldn’t be so time-consuming.

Newcomb’s idea of how Hiss made his summaries was “rather vague.” She thought “he just penned little notes on small memo pads” and attached them to telegrams, which would then “go into Mr. Sayre’s office” with the notes “still attached,” as far as she could recall. Later, the notes would be sent for destruction along with the corresponding telegrams. 23

However, there was a fourth person in Sayre’s office, besides Sayre, Hiss and Newcomb – Sayre’s secretary, Eunice Lincoln – who would not confirm this description of office procedure. Lincoln did not recall Hiss making handwritten notes, and did not know why he would have made such notes. Her description of some of the procedural details in Sayre’s office differed from Newcomb’s. Moreover, Lincoln saw no purpose in making summaries of incoming telegrams; in her opinion, “Any Assistant Secretary should read the document, a summary of which I think may give not the full impression or import of the message.”

Lincoln’s testimony disturbed Assistant U.S. Attorney Whearty, who was presenting the case to the grand jury along with Donegan:

MR. WHEARTY: That disturbs me greatly because there were four of you in the office, and three agreed that the handwritten notes accompanied a number of these telegrams, and you seem to be in a minority, and you seem to be in a position to know what went on and best qualified to state the fact. You categorically testify as far as you remember there was definitely not the practice to find documents with little handwritten summaries on them prepared by Mr. Hiss, and yet on the other hand Mr. Sayre, Miss Newcomb and Mr. Hiss have testified that such memoranda were made. Are you sure you are right about it or is it possible you may be confusing such things with something else? Have you any explanation of that?

THE WITNESS: I am just trying to think. I haven’t. I won’t say I am right. After all, three testified that they did, but I do not recall it. I won’t say that a summary was never made. I do not recall it was the general practice.

The questioning concluded with the following exchange between a juror and Eunice Lincoln:

JUROR: Is it a practice in memoranda, is there a danger it might not be as accurate as the original document, therefore a short telegram or a two page document is rather bad practice and error might occur? Would you say it was bad business?

THE WITNESS: In my estimation it is bad business. If you can’t read the original document you shouldn’t be in the job you are in making policy.

JUROR: I want to make it clear. 24

We will get back to Eunice Lincoln’s opinion later, when discussing intelligence tradecraft as described by Chambers.

Stanley Hornbeck, Hiss’s boss at the Far Eastern Division of the State Department from 1939 to 1944, did not testify before the grand jury. However, he testified at both Alger Hiss perjury trials, and he recalled “Hiss making handwritten notes to summarize documents for him.” 25

Going through Alger Hiss records at the U.S. National Archives in March 2007, I came across a folder entitled, “Miscellaneous Records Relating to Far East, 1937-44,” which included 14 pages of Alger Hiss’s memos, handwritten in pencil and dated between July 27, 1937 and August 8, 1940. 26 The folder gives no idea of the specific time and purpose of Hiss’s summaries of State Department dispatches, which are mostly from Tokyo, Japan. It appears that, at some point after August 8, 1940, Hiss was excerpting text from notes he had made earlier in order to brief his boss, Stanley Hornbeck.

Alger Hiss note

Alger Hiss note

The first page of Hiss’s handwritten notes has a note-pad sheet clipped in its upper left-hand corner, which looks similar in format to the notes in the Baltimore Documents. It seems that Hiss was indeed in the habit of writing memos to himself.

When I first met Alger Hiss’s son, Tony Hiss, in 2002, I discovered that this was a family trait: Tony scribbled notes throughout our conversation – and has continued to do so during our infrequent meetings over the years.

However, I will let you judge for yourself what the documents say in the case of two of the four notes in Hiss’s handwriting that Chambers submitted in Baltimore in November, 1948:

The Potez-63 note and the Mary Martin note.

***

CLICK HERE to read “The Baltimore Documents” chapter from a book by William A. Reuben, The Crimes of Alger Hiss, based on his 50-year-long investigation of the Hiss case. Reuben, who had almost completed the book before his death in 2004, was once described as “an encyclopedia on the Hiss Case who walks like a man.” The book will be published posthumously.

***

Watch for notices on this site regarding discussion of other Baltimore documents.

  1. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr. Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 104.
  2. E.A.Tamm to the FBI Director, Hoover, January 23, 1947. – The FBI FOIA Rosenberg File, Subject Silvermaster, File No 65-56402, Vol. 093, Serials 2000-2081, pp. 20-21.
  3. E.P. Morgan to H.H. Clegg, January 14, 1947. – Ibid., Vol. 093, Serials 2000-2081, pp. 166-170. A late October 1950 FBI follow-up memo describes Morgan as a “former Inspector” of the FBI – A.S. Brent to C.E. Hennrich, Oct. 30, 1950. – Ibid., Vol. 150, Serials 3835-3896, p. 2 (pdf. p. 51.)
  4. E.A. Tamm to the Director, February 21, 1947. – Ibid., Vol. 098, Serials 2183 to 2210, p. 38.
  5. Allen Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, p. 229.
  6. Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers. A Biography. New York: The Modern Library, 1998, p. 108.
  7. Sam Tanenhaus, Op. cit., p. 295.
  8. Transcripts of Grand Jury Testimony in the Alger Hiss Case. Testimony of Whittaker Chambers, December 7, 1948, pp. 3571, 3573; here and after, copies of grand jury transcripts courtesy of Louis Hartshorn.
  9. J.V. Fletcher to D.M. Ladd, September 30, 1948. – The FBI Subject Silvermaster File, Op. Cit., Vol. 145, Series 3647-3665, p. 10; D.M. Ladd to E.A. Tamm, November 15, 1945 – Ibid., Vol. 001, Series x-50, p. 46; D.M. Ladd to the F.B.I. Director, February 15, 1949 – Ibid., Vol. 147, Serials 3691-3730, p. 72.
  10. J.V. Fletcher to Ladd, August 2, 1948 – Ibid., Volume 138, Serials 3271-3350, p. 198.
  11. Bureau from New York to Director, urgent, October 15, 1948 – Ibid., Vol. 147, Serials 3691-2730, pp. 4-5 (PDF, pp. 20-21.)
  12. Transcripts of Grand Jury Testimony in the Alger Hiss Case. Testimony of Whittaker Chambers, December 8, 1948, p. 3593-3594, 3596.
  13. Lichnyi arkhiv Stalina (Stalin Private Papers), fund 558, description 11, RGASPI.
  14. Lichnyi arkhiv Molotova (The Private Papers of Molotov), fund 82, description 2, RGASPI.
  15. Fond sekretariata M.M. Litvinova (The Records of M.M. Livinov Office) – Arkhiv vneshnej politiki Rossiiskoj Federatsii (AVP RF), Fund 05, despcriptions 17 (1937), 18 (1938).
  16. VOKS collection, fund 5283, descriptions 14 for “open” file keeping and 1a and 2a for “special file keeping”, GARF.
  17. Whittaker Chambers’s testimony to the grand jury, January 9, 1949. – Transcripts of Grand Jury Testimony in the Alger Hiss Case, pp. 3847-3848.
  18. The term of the first grand jury expired on December 15, 1948, the same day that it indicted Hiss on two counts of perjury. The second grand jury was impaneled on December 16, 1948 and continued working until May 1949.
  19. Cit: Allen Weinstein, Op. cit., pp. 449, 247-248.
  20. Allen Weinstein. Op. cit., p. 248.
  21. Testimony of Frances B. Sayre, December 22, 1948. – Ibid., pp. 4809, 4810.
  22. Ibid., p. 4812.
  23. Testimony of Anna Belle Newcomb, December 22, 1948. – Ibid., pp. 4884-4885.
  24. Testimony of Eunice Adaline Lincoln, January 4, 1949. – Ibid., pp. 4924-4926, 4957-4958, 4968.
  25. Cit. Perjury, p. 448, p. 479-480.
  26. Alger Hiss Files, Box 27. – RG 59, General files of the Department of State, NA, College Park, MD.